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Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
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I. INTRODUCTION
Commentators continue to struggle with the meaning of the Con-
stitution's Necessary and Proper Clause. Some have given up, and
pronounced the Clause meaningless. Professor Mark A. Graber
writes that, "[T]he necessary and proper clause satisfies historical
tests for stupidity: The framers did not seriously consider its meaning,
and prominent defenders of the constitution subsequently confessed
that the provision was unnecessary and unintelligible. 3 Among the
unanswered questions about the Clause are how "necessary" a law
must be to the exercise of an enumerated power;4 what the meaning of
"proper" is; 5 and whether the provision is an affirmative grant of
6power, a limitation on power, or a mere rule of construction.
The doubts are understandable because, read in isolation, the
Clause is not. Although some uncertainties can be resolved by tex-
tual analysis,7 others defy it. For example, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's classic exposition of the Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland8
seems open to challenge because its definition of "necessary" is so at
odds with common usage.9 For this reason, some have attempted to
reconstruct the historical meaning of the Clause, but their interpreta-
tions seem incomplete. 10 Others find the historical case hopeless."
THE COMPLEAT CLERK AND SCRIVENER'S GUIDE (H. Twyford, London 1655) [hereinafter
COMPLEAT CLERK];
THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (4 vols.) (Alan Watson et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter
JUSTINIAN, DIGEST] (all translations of this work are by the Watson group);
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jen-
sen et al. eds., 1976) (multiple vols. projected; not all completed) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY];
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (4 vols.)
[hereinafter Farrand];
THE YOUNG CLERK'S VADE MECUM OR COMPLEAT LAW-TUTOR (1776) (Belfast; re-
printed New York) [hereinafter VADE MECUM];
GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(Vintage Books 1979) (1978) [hereinafter WILLS].
3 Graber, supra note 2, at 167.
4 Id. at 168 ("No one besides John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton, however, seriously
contends that 'necessary . . . means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful or condu-
sive to'."). See also Eugene Gressman, Some Thoughts on the Necessary and Proper Clause, 31
SETON HALL L. REV. 37 (2001).
5 Id. at 167 ("The phrase 'necessary and proper' also obliterates the distinction between
constitutionality and wisdom .... ); LYNCH, supra note 2, at 20 ("Did 'necessary and proper'
mean the same as 'necessary'?").
6 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 2.
7 See infra Part I.
8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
9 See Graber, supra note 2, at 168.
10 E.g., Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 297 (suggesting a jurisdictional meaning of
"proper," but seeming to concede other limitations of "proper" by stating that the term limited
[Vol. 55:2
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In this Article, I respectfully submit that the meaning of the Clause
has seemed unclear because commentators, especially modem ones,
have not been looking in the right place. The lawyers who drafted the
Necessary and Proper Clause took its language directly out of con-
temporary agency law and usage. The purpose of the Clause was to
reinforce the role of Congress as the agent of the people, exercising
implied incidental ("necessary," as a legal term of art) powers "for
carrying into Execution" their written instructions (the Constitution),
subject to prevailing fiduciary norms ("proper"). Moreover, during
the ensuing struggle over whether to adopt the Constitution, this was
the meaning (without most of the legal jargon, of course) that the fed-
eralists sold to the ratifying public.
In this, or any other, study of the original meaning of an uncertain
constitutional provision, I operate under a few premises. The first is
that the legally relevant issue is not the "original intent" of the draft-
ers, but the objective meaning to (or understanding of) the ratifiers.
The principle is closely analogous to that applied in contract law: If
the subjective, hidden intent of an offeror is not reflected in the offer
and is different from the understanding of the offeree, then generally
it is not part of the ensuing contract. 12 This premise, which reflects
the view that the Constitution (as amended by the Bill of Rights), was
a political bargain among contending factions, has been gaining ac-
ceptance among scholars across the political spectrum.' 3
My second premise is about the relative reliability of various kinds
of historical evidence. I generally do not give much credence to post-
Congress in "at least" three ways).
II E.g., Graber, supra note 2, at 168-69:
The records of the Constitutional Convention provide no help. The Committee on
Detail gave no hint why it chose the language it did, and the Convention in turn ap-
parently perceived these particular alterations to prior drafts as merely
stylistic .... Delegates who thought the phrase "necessary and proper" would clearly
demonstrate that Congress did not have an unlimited authority to pass laws were
quickly disabused of that foolish notion by anti-Federalist commentators .... Con-
stitutional defenders proved unable to respond to these anti-Federalist criticisms.
12 Cf. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 114 (1982) (objective theory of contracts
generally prevails); BARNETr, RESTORING, supra note 2, at 100-03.
11 Compare RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 8-9, 17-18, who leans toward "progressive" views,
with Barnett, supra note 2, at 187, who leans toward "libertarian" views. As Professor Barnett
points out, the focus on secret intent rather than meaning/understanding limits the legal (al-
though not necessarily the historical) value of Professor Joseph Lynch's recent work on the
clause. Barnett, supra note 2, at 187; Cf LYNCH, supra note 2.
For other treatments of original meaning and how it is contrasted with original intent and
original understanding, see, e.g., BARNETr, RESTORING, supra note 2, at 89-117; Vasan Kesa-
van & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretative Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting
History, 91 GEORGETOWN L. REV. 1113, 1124-48 (2003).
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ratification material;' 4 particularly unreliable are controverted allega-
tions of constitutional meaning made from memory or in the heat of
battle. I resort to post-ratification material only when confirmatory of
other evidence and generally uncontradicted. Instead, I tend to rely
more on statements, representations, and known background facts
(such as the state of the law) during the ratification process. The in-
tent of delegates at the federal convention, to the extent it can be re-
trieved, also is very useful, because it often sheds light on the under-
standing of the' ratifiers.
This Article consists of nine Parts, of which Part I is this Introduc-
tion. In Part II, I subject the Necessary and Proper Clause to textual
analysis, incorporating in that analysis the eighteenth century defini-
tions of words. I thereby resolve a few questions, but also show why
textual analysis alone cannot clarify other uncertainties.
Part III examines the drafting history of the Clause at the federal
constitutional convention. I conclude that the primary drafters-four
distinguished lawyers-intended it to incorporate concepts from con-
temporary agency law, specifically the doctrine of implied incidental
agency powers and the limitations of fiduciary duty. Part IV surveys
the development and content of the agency concepts that the drafters
intended the Necessary and Proper Clause to embody.
Part V examines proceedings in the federal convention after the
Clause was drafted. Part VI surveys the ratification process. Be-
cause of the importance of the ratification process in revealing origi-
nal meaning, Part VI is particularly detailed. It shows that the intent
of the drafters, without undue use of legal technical terms, was fairly
represented to the ratifying public. The public then approved the
Constitution, although with the expectation of speedy amendment to
ensure that the doctrine of incidental agency powers would not be
applied too broadly.
Part VII shows how the 1791 debates over the first national
bank-as contentious as they were on application of the Clause-still
reflected a consensus as to its essential meaning. As befits the treat-
ment of post-ratification material, the focus in Part VII is not on is-
sues under dispute, but on the disputants' fundamental agreement on
matters of principle.
Part VIII suggests some interpretative implications arising from
this study, while Part IX is a short conclusion.
'4 Post-ratification materials are relied on heavily by some writers. See, e.g., Lawson &
Granger, supra note 2, at 294-97.
[Vol. 55:2
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II. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CLAUSE AND THE LIMITS OF TEXTUAL
ANALYSIS
There are fundamental questions that must be answered before one
can understand the Necessary and Proper Clause. The first of these is
whether the Clause establishes an objective (judicially reviewable)
standard for legislation or leaves legislation solely to congressional
discretion. The second is the role of the Clause in the Constitution: Is
it a grant of power, a limitation on power, or a rule of construction?
The third is the meaning of "necessary"-just how restrictive a term
is it? The fourth question is: What is the meaning, in this context, of
the term "proper"? The fifth question is whether "and" is used in a
conjunctive or disjunctive sense.
This Part examines each of these questions using traditional textual
analysis. Textual analysis requires that we ascertain the ordinary
eighteenth century meanings of key words in the Clause and then
make "logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of
the text."' 15 I conclude that textual analysis can resolve only the first
of the five questions with any certainty, although it does provide
some guidance for resolving the remainder.
A. Does the Necessary and Proper Clause Establish an Objective
or Subjective Test of a Law's Validity?
Some have described the Necessary and Proper Clause as an
"Elastic Clause,"'16 adding a reservoir of otherwise unspecified federal
powers to the Congressional store. This view has its antecedents dur-
ing the ratification debates, when anti-federalists claimed that the
Clause would grant Congress the power to pass whatever laws it
"deemed necessary" or "thought proper"17-that is, to legislate at
discretion.18
15 Cf Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LoY. L. REV. 611, 621
(1999) (describing "original meaning analysis" as "references to dictionaries, common contem-
porary meanings, and logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the text.").
16 See About the Constitution, available at
http://dhillman.com/const/about the constitution.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004); see also
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 87-88 (1987) (paraphrasing several
arguments of this type).
17 See, e.g., An Old Whig I1, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (October 17), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 402 ("An Old Whig"):
Under such a clause as this, can anything be said to be reserved and kept back from
Congress? Can it be said that the Congress have no power but what is expressed?
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" is in other words to make all
such laws which the Congress shall think necessary and proper,-for who shall
judge for the legislature what is necessary and proper?-Who shall set themselves
above the sovereign?-What inferior legislature shall set itself above the supreme
legislature?-To me it appears that no other power on earth can dictate to them, or
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Textual analysis demonstrates this view to be unsupportable. The
Clause provides that a law "shall be" necessary and proper. When the
drafters wished to communicate a grant of unreviewable discretion,
they used phrases such as "shall think proper,"'19 "the Congress
may,,' 20 and "as he shall judge necessary and expedient." 2' The Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, unlike those others, suggests that congres-
22sional choices are subject to judicial review. Moreover, the Clause
clearly restricts the purposes for which laws may be adopted: It vali-
control them, unless by force.., for surely it cannot justly be said that they have no
power but what is expressly given to them, when by the very terms of their creation
they are vested with the powers of making laws in all cases necessary and proper;
when from the nature of their power, they must necessarily be the judges, what laws
are necessary and proper .... And in such cases it is not of a farthing consequence
whether they really are of opinion that the law is necessary and proper, or only pre-
tend to think so, for who can overrule their pretensions? (emphasis in original).
See also Brutus I, New York Journal (October 18), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 413:
A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execu-
tion, all powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or any
department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for
ought I know, be exercised in such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures.
Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to support their gov-
emnment and pay the state debt, may the Congress repeal this law, because it may prevent
the collection of a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the
general welfare of the United States? (Emphasis in original).
See also Brutus V, NEW YORK JOURNAL (December 13), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 423 ("The inference is natural that the legislature will have an authority to make all
laws which they shall judge necessary for the common safety, and to promote the general wel-
fare. This amounts to a power to make laws at discretion ...."); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 338 (John Williams, speaking at the New York ratifying convention).
I8 For examples of the contemporary use of such phrases to mean "at discretion," see
Notes of Madison (May 29, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting the Virginia Plan:
"13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whenso-
ever it shall seem necessary ..."); Notes of Madison (June 15, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note
2, at 243 (quoting the New Jersey Plan, "to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall
deem proper & expedient").
19 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress.").
See also id. at art. H, § 3 ("and in Case of Disagreement between them [the Houses of Con-
gress], with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he [the President] may adjourn them to such
Time as he shall think proper"); id. at art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution ....").
Cf I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 400 ("annually judged necessary by our legislature");
3 id. at 74 ("They may also assess such rates, or scots, upon the owners of lands within their
district, as they shall judge necessary.").
20 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 ("but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.").
21 Id. at art. 11, § 3 ("He [the President] shall from time to time give to the Congress In-
formation of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient ....").
22 Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 276-77.
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dates only laws enacted to "carry[] into Execution" powers granted
elsewhere in the document.23
The conclusion that congressional decisions under the Necessary
and Proper Clause are reviewable judicially was adopted by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch. Despite Marshall's broad interpreta-
tion of the Clause, he affirmed that Congress may not use the enu-
merated powers as "pretexts" to achieve unlisted purposes.24
B. Is the Clause a Grant, Limitation, or Recital of Power?
Some refinements aside,25 there are three possible roles for the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The first of these is as a grant of power
not given in other parts of the Constitution. Arguing for this interpre-
tation are two textual observations: the Clause is in the form of a
grant ("The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws") and
the drafters placed it in Article I, Section 8, which otherwise consists
entirely of grants and accompanying qualifications.26 Arguing against
this interpretation is that the powers "granted" by the Necessary and
Proper Clause all are bestowed elsewhere in the document. They are
inherent in Article I, Section 1, which states that "All legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"
since the essence of "legislative Powers" is to pass laws.27 The
"powers herein granted" are, of course, those in the first seventeen
clauses of Article I, Section 8 and scattered elsewhere throughout the
28Constitution.
23 Id. at 274-75.
24 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.):
Nor does the rule of interpretation we contend for, sanction any usurpation, on the part of
the national government; since, if the argument be, that the implied powers of the constitu-
tion may be assumed and exercised, for purposes not really connected with the powers
specifically granted, under color of some imaginary relation between them: the answer is,
that this is nothing more than arguing from the abuse of constitutional powers, which
would equally apply against the use of those that are confessedly granted to the national
government; that the danger of the abuse will be checked by the judicial department,
which, by comparing the means with the proposed end, will decide, whether the connec-
tion is real, or assumed as the pretext for the usurpation of powers not belonging to the
government ....
Id. at 358-59.
25 For example, one can argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a grant followed by
a limitation or a rule of construction followed by a limitation.
26 Cf. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 107-08 ("This is an enumerated power; the term 'implied
powers' is a misnomer .... As regards the other two branches, the Clause acts as a ratchet to
enhance, but not diminish, each branch's discretion.").
27 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412; THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 2, at 159
(Alexander Hamilton).
28 E.g., U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States."); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("The Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
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Another possible interpretation of the provision is that it limits (or
qualifies) Congressional power. 29 Under this view, the Necessary and
Proper Clause invalidates any law not necessary, not proper, or not an
exercise of an enumerated power.3 ° Contending for this view is the
fact, already noted, that the power to pass laws in execution of enu-
merated powers is granted elsewhere.31 The principal textual argu-
ments to the contrary are the form of the Clause and its placement in
the same section with seventeen other grants.
A third interpretation of the Clause is that it adds no powers of
substance, but serves only as a rule of construction. By this view, its
function is much the same as the function some see for the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments32-as a statement of interpretative principle. By
these lights, the Clause was placed in the Constitution to communi-
cate to the ratifying public, to officers of the new government, to the
states, and to the courts that the powers of the new Congress were not
to be limited to those expressly delegated, as under the Articles of
Confederation. 33 Congressional powers encompassed implied author-
ity as well.34
Considerations militating in favor of the "rule of construction" ap-
proach are: the apparent grant of the same powers elsewhere in the
Constitution, and the unlikelihood that a pure limitation would be
located in Article I, Section 8 instead of in Article I, Section 9.35 The
principal drawback of the "rule of construction" view is that it leaves
the Clause as substantive surplus-which, of course, offends a well-
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
29 Cf Gressman, supra note 4, at 40 (stating that "this McCulloch three-part test has
placed an important limitation on the power of Congress to enact laws that are 'necessary and
proper"').
30 Cf Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 332 (concluding that Wickard v. Filbum, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) sustaining a federal agricultural program was wrongly decided because not
"proper" to the federal commerce power).
31 Supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
32 Opinion on the scope of the Ninth Amendment is sharply divided, but practically all
writers agree that whatever else it may do, it certainly serves as a rule of construction against the
conclusion that federal power covers the entire field outside the exceptions in the Bill of Rights.
For a collection of views, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). For the view that the
Tenth Amendment is but a "truism," see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
33 ARTS. OF CONFED., art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independ-
ence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.").
-4 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 2, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton).
35 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (containing the primary limitations on Congress in the initial
Constitution, including bans on limiting the slave trade until 1808, suspending the writ of ha-
beas corpus, passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, assessing direct taxes without
apportionment, imposing duties on exports, granting preferences to ports in some states, spend-
ing money without legislative appropriations, and granting titles of nobility).
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established constructional preference. 36 Moreover, the resulting sur-
plus is not merely a short phrase, but an independent provision thirty-
nine words long.
These considerations are balanced closely enough so that it seems,
to me at least, that there is no purely textual way to determine the
Clause's precise role in the Constitution.
C. What is the Meaning of "Necessary?"
The first major controversy after ratification concerning the word
"necessary" arose in the debates over the constitutionality of Con-
gress chartering a national bank. Some Bank opponents argued that
"necessary" meant "absolutely necessary"-that is, indispensable. By
way of example, in rejoinder to President Washington's request for
his opinion on the Bank's constitutiohiality, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson wrote-
The second general phrase [in Article I, Section 8] is, "to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion the enumerated powers." But they can all be carried into
execution without a bank. A bank, therefore, is not neces-
sary, and, consequently, not authorised [sic] by this phrase.37
The premise for the argument that "necessary" means "indispensa-
ble" is that the Clause granted only so much implied power as re-
quired to prevent the enumerated powers from being nugatory. 38 Jef-
ferson and other bank opponents maintained that Congress may adopt
a measure only if there is no other way of executing one of the pow-
ers expressly granted.
In response, bank proponents pointed out that the drafters had used
the phrase "absolutely necessary" in another part of the Constitu-
tion.39 This implied that, when unmodified, "necessity" need not be
absolute.40 Bank proponents did not mention that on two occasions
the drafters had used the unmodified word "necessary" in contexts
where it could mean only "indispensable." One of these occurrences
36 For the preference, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 290 (detailing how promi-
nent leaders of that era distinguished between the words "necessary" and "proper").
37 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, in BANK HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 92 (emphasis in original).
38 Id. at 93.
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing it's [sic] inspection Laws.").
40 Chief Justice Marshall adopted this position in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 387-88 (1819).
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was the Constitution's reference to the requisite majority in the House
of Representatives for electing the President; 4' the other was the re-
quirement that both houses of Congress concur in a bill before it goes
to the President for signature.42
Still, the proponents of the bank had the better of this argument
because both of the constitutional provisions where "necessary"
means "indispensable" involve legal-procedural requirements rather
than vaguer issues of policy. The records of the constitutional de-
bates and contemporary legal sources such as Blackstone's Commen-
taries confirm that the term "necessary" often meant "indispensable"
in the legal-procedural context,43 while in the policy context the term
could, and often did, signify something less demanding."a Thus,
when the drafters sought to specify indispensability in policy, they
employed the phrase, "absolutely necessary." By using that phrase,
they signaled, that, in the absence of Congressional consent, a state
could impose a tax on imports or exports only when "but for" the tax,
the state's inspection laws were impossible to execute.45
Supporters of the bank also pointed out that requiring any particu-
lar law to be indispensable would, in many cases, itself render enu-
merated powers nugatory. 46 This is because in many situations adopt-
ing one of several options is indispensable to executing a power, but
no single choice is indispensable. 47 Su ppose that executing Congress'
power to regulate the value of money requires that Congress adopt
one of three bills: a bill chartering a national bank, a bill creating a
government-owned financial clearing house, or a proposal to super-
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3 ( in a House of Representatives election for the President,
the delegations shall vote by states and "a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
Choice").
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur-
rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ... shall be presented to the
President of the United States.").
43 E.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 76 ("To make a particular custom good, the fol-
lowing are necessary requisites .... "); id. at 107 ("The word, heirs, is necessary in the grant or
donation in order to make a fee, or inheritance. For if land be given to a man for ever, or to him
and his assigns for ever, this vests in him but an estate for life."); Notes of Paterson (June 16,
1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 272 (quoting James Wilson, discussing the constitution of
Holland: "the Vote of every Province necessary").
44 For examples of a sliding scale in policy matters, see infra notes 64-79 and accompany-
ing text.
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
46 This seems to be Congressman Sedgwick's point, made during the congressional debate
on the first Bank of the United States. 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1962 (February 4, 1791)
("Such a construction would be infinitely too narrow and limited; and to apply the meaning
strictly, it would prove, perhaps, that all the laws which had been passed were unconstitutional;
for few, if any of them, could be proved indispensable to the existence of the Government.").
47 See, e.g., Graber, supra note 2, at 167 ("There is, for example, no necessary way of
leaving a room with two doors.").
48 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5 ("To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof.
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vise state-chartered banks. Congress must adopt one of the three in
order to execute the power, but no one is indispensable because either
of the other two could do the job. So if "necessary" means "indispen-
sable," Congress could enact none of the three, and the express power
of the regulating the value of money would remain unexecuted.
Bank supporters missed another clue that "necessary" does not
mean "indispensable." The provision immediately preceding the
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power "to exercise
like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legis-
lature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Build-
ings."49
"Needful" was an acknowledged synonym for "necessary," 50 and
in fact an earlier draft of that provision had used the word "necessary"
instead of "needful.' While it is absolutely necessary (needful) for
Congress to authorize forts, magazines, arsenals, and dock yards, it
would be a rare event for any single installation to be indispensable.
An interpretation makes no sense if it would render unconstitutional a
law establishing a dock-yard at Charleston because an alternative
proposal for Newport News kept the Charleston site from being in-
dispensable.
Written in rebuttal to Jefferson's view that a bank could not be
"necessary" because it was not indispensable was Secretary of the
Treasury Alexander Hamilton's Opinion on the Constitutionality of
the National Bank. There, Hamilton equated "necessary" with expe-
dient: "It is certain," he wrote, "that neither the grammatical, nor
popular sense of the term, requires that construction [i.e., indispensa-
ble]." On the contrary, "necessary often means no more than needful,
requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to. ,52 In McCulloch,53
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). See also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2,
at 241 ("No assise of novel disseisin, for common, shall lie against a lord for erecting on the
common any windmill, sheephouse, or other necessary buildings therein specified.").
50 2 JOHNSON, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "necessary"); McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819) ("'Necessary and proper' are, then, equivalent to
needful and adapted."); Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton on the Constitu-
tionality of the National Bank, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at 97.
51 Journal (August 18, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 321, 325.
52 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton Opinion on the Constitutionality
of a National Bank, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at 97 (emphasis in original).
Later in the opinion, Hamilton virtually read the word "necessary" out of the Clause:
The degree in which a measure is necessary, can never be a test of the legal right to
adopt it. That must be a matter of opinion, and can only be a test of expediency.
The relation between the measure and the end; between the nature of the mean em-
ployed towards the execution of the power, and the object of that power; must be the
criterion of constitutionality .... [T]he powers contained in a constitution of gov-
ernment.., ought to be construed liberally in advancement of the public good.
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Chief Justice Marshall substantially agreed, stating that "necessary"
could mean merely "convenient, or useful, or essential. 54
Yet textual analysis in the light of common eighteenth century us-
age leaves one puzzled by Hamilton and Marshall's interpretation.
How could "necessary" mean merely "convenient," "useful" or "ex-
pedient? '55  The leading dictionary of the time lists multiple entries
for "necessary," but not a single one of these entries comes close to
"expedient," "convenient," or "useful., 56  The Constitution uses the
term "expedient" in contrast to "necessary" under circumstances that
would create surplusage if they meant the same thing.57 Contempo-
rary writers regularly treated necessity as a different-and contrast-
ing-concept from convenience. John Adams, for example, wrote
that "[one] can ... lose none of his property, or the necessaries, con-
veniences, or ornaments of life."58 Richard Price, a favorite commen-
tator among American Whigs59-in speaking of Americans in
1785-wrote that, "[t]he country they inhabit includes soils and cli-
mates of all sorts, producing not only every necessary, but every con-
venience of life." 6  William Blackstone frequently distinguished ne-
cessity from concepts less demanding.61  Delegates to the various
Id. at 98 (emphasis in original).
53 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5 Id. at 413 ("If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in ap-
proved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or
useful, or essential to another.").
5 Johnson's dictionary offers the following as the primary definition of "expedient":
"Proper; fit; convenient; suitable." The only other definition seems confined to Shakespeare. I
JOHNSON, supra note 2 (unpaginated).
56 Thus, Samuel Johnson's Dictionary contains the following first definition of "neces-
sary": "I. Needful, indispensably requisite." Id. Then follow three literary selections, the first
two using "necessary" in the sense of absolutely necessary, but the last quoting Swift: "The
Dutch would go on to challenge the military govemment and the revenues, and reckon them
among what shall be thought necessary for their barrier." Id. The dictionary continues: "2. Not
free; fatal; impelled by fate. 3. Conclusive; decisive by inevitable consequence." Id.
57 U.S. CONST., art. I1, § 3. This section is discussed infra note 106 and accompanying
text.
58 The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN
ADAMS 56 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
59 Price was regularly cited during the constitutional debates. See, e.g., Notes of Yates
(June 27, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 441 (quoting Luther Martin); Luther Martin,
Genuine Information IV (January 8), BALTIMORE MARYLAND GAZETrE, in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 301 (Luther Martin, then an anti-federalist); Tamony, VIRGINIA
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (January 9), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,id. at 323
(referencing "the celebrated Dr. Price"); 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 265
("Fabius IX," Pennsylvania Mercury (May 1), reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 265).
60 Richard Price, Of the Importance of the Revolution which has Established the Inde-
pendence of the United States (1785), available at http://www.constitution.org/price/price.txt
(last visited Aug. 29, 2004) (emphasis added).
61 E.g. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 121 ("necessary and expedient"); 3 BLACKSTONE,
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federal and state conventions-including Hamilton himself62-used
the terms in a similar way.63
It is true that contemporary usage in the policy arena reveals a
spectrum of meanings for "necessary." At its strongest, the word
meant "indispensable." 64  Besides the phrases "absolutely neces-
,65 ,~66sary'  and "indispensably necessary, one encounters many weaker
supra note 2, at 300 (same); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 408 ("King Edward, on his return
from his French dominions in the seventeenth year of his reign, after upwards of three years
absence, found it necessary (or convenient) to prosecute his judges"); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 2, Supplement, at iii ("neither necessary nor convenient"). Cf 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note
2, at 352 ("prudent and necessary").
62 E.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 355 (quoting Hamilton at the New York
ratifying convention: "necessary and useful").
63 E.g., Notes of Madison (August 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 297 ("Mr.
Gouvemr. Morris opposed it as unnecessary and inconvenient."); Notes of Madison (August 18,
1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 327:
Mr. Rutlidge's [sic] motion was referred-He then moved that a Grand Committee
<be appointed to> consider the necessity and expediency of the U- States assuming
all the State debts-A regular settlement between the Union & the several States
would never take place. The assumption would be just as the State debts were con-
tracted in the common defence. It was necessary, as the taxes on imports the only
sure source of revenue were to be given up to the Union. It was politic, as by dis-
burdening the people of the State debts it would conciliate them to the plan.
See also Caleb Strong to Alexander Hodgden (July 30, 1787), in Hutson, SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 2, at 199 ("it will be very convenient and even necessary for me that the Order should be
answered"); James Wilson, Ratification Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), available at
http://www.lexrex.com/enlightened/writings/jwilson.htm ("yet I do not know a nation in the
world which has not found it necessary and useful to maintain the appearance of strength in a
season of the most profound tranquility."); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 282 (John Jay,
at the New York ratifying convention, "it is both necessary and practicable"); id. at 308 (John
Lansing, at the same convention: "unnecessary and useless").
64 JOHNSON, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "necessary" in part as "indispensably
requisite"); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; Notes of Madison (June 6,
1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 132-33 ("The Legislature ought to be the most exact tran-
script of the whole Society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for
the people to act collectively."); Notes of King (June 6, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 143
(quoting Dickinson, "We cannot form a national Govt. as is proposed unless we draw a Br. from
the people, & a Br. from the legislature-it is necessary in theory-And essential to the success
of the project ....").
65 E.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 26; Notes of Madison (June 1, 1787), in I Far-
rand, supra note 2, at 67 (discussing Madison's position at the federal convention); Notes of
Madison (June 8, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 164 (same); Notes of Yates (June 11,
1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 207 (discussing speech of Randolph); Richard Price, Ob-
servations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and
Policy of the War with America (1776), available at
http://www.constitution.org/price/price.txt (last visited Aug. 29, 2004) ("All government, even
within a state, becomes tyrannical as far as it is a needless and wanton exercise of power, or is
carried farther than is absolutely necessary to preserve the peace and to secure the safety of the
state.").
66 E.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 225; S.C. CONST. pmbl. (1776), available at
http://www.yale.edulawweb/avalon/states/scOl.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004); Notes of
Madison (June 8, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing speech of Charles Pinck-
ney: "He urged that such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it
effectual .... ); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 293 (R.R. Livingston, speaking at the
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meanings: "extremely necessary, '67 "highly necessary' '68 "more nec-
essary,,69 "less necessary, ''7° "too necessary, ' 71 "so necessary, '' 72 "in
some degree necessary, ' 73 and "equally necessary. 74  That having
been said, in ordinary usage, I have been able to find no meaning
weaker than that approximating, "without which the particular result
would be difficult. 75
To select only one of many good contemporary writers, consider
how "Agrippa," an anti-federalist, used "necessary." In his first "let-
ter," Agrippa wrote: "It is a fact justified by the experience of all
mankind from the earliest antiquity down to the present time, that
freedom is necessary to industry. 76 (The sense here is "indispensa-
ble.") In his fourth "letter," he claimed: "The inhabitants of warmer
climates are more dissolute in their manners, and less industrious,
than in colder countries. A degree of severity is, therefore, necessary
with one which would cramp the spirit of the other."77 (The sense is
quite strong-either indispensable or reasonably necessary.) In his
ninth Letter, Agrippa used the word more comparatively, but still
firmly:
Three restrictions appear to me to be essentially necessary to
preserve the equality of rights to the states . . . .The third
seems to be equally necessary.
New York ratifying convention).
67 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 181; Notes of Madison (June 1, 1787), in 1 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 197 (quoting paper written by Benjamin Franklin for the Committee).
68 E.g., I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 15, 25.
69 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 137; Notes of Madison (June 21, 1787), in 1 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 357 (speech by Madison); Notes of Madison (August 9, 1787), in 2 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 239 (describing speech by Williamson).
70 Notes of Madison (June 11, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 251 (describing speech
by Paterson).
71 Notes of Madison (September 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 627-28 ("The
motion being lost by the equal division <of votes,> It was urged that it be put a second time,
some such provision being too necessary, to be omitted, and on a second question it was agreed
to nem. con.") (Nem. con. means unanimously (by states)-neroine contradicente.).
72 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 55; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 63.
73 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 43.
74 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 257; Notes of Madison (July 2, 1787), in I Farrand,
supra note 2, at 512 (describing speech by Gouverneur Morris).
75 Compare Notes of Madison (June 2, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 88 (quoting
Randolph: "2. that a unity [in the executive] was unnecessary a plurality being equally compe-
tent to all the objects of the department") with Notes of Pierce (June 2, 1787), in I Farrand,
supra note 2, at 92 ("Mr. Butler was of opinion that a unity of the Executive would be necessary
in order to promote dispatch.").
76 Agrippa I, Massachusetts Gazette (November 23), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 305 (emphasis added).
77 Agrippa IV, Massachusetts Gazette (December 4), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 382 (emphasis added).
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To promote the happiness of the people it is necessary that
there should be local laws; and it is necessary that those laws
should be made by the representatives of those who are im-
mediately subject to the want of them. By endeavouring to
suit both extremes, both are injured.78
I have placed more examples from policy contexts in the footnote,
some of them comparative in nature.79
78 Agrippa IX, Massachusetts Gazette (December 28), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 540 (emphasis added).
79 See, e.g., I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 153 (communicating something between ab-
solute necessity and common convenience):
The distinction of rank and honours is necessary in every well-governed state; in or-
der to reward such as are eminent for their services to the public, in a manner the
most desirable to individuals, and yet without burthen to the community; exciting
thereby an ambitious yet laudable ardor, and generous emulation in others. And
emulation, or virtuous ambition, is a spring of action which, however dangerous or
invidious in a mere republic or under a despotic sway, will certainly be attended with
good effects under a free monarchy; where, without destroying it's [sic] existence,
it's [sic] excesses may be continually restrained by that superior power, from which
all honour is derived.
A body of nobility is also more peculiarly necessary in our mixed and compounded
constitution, in order to support the rights of both the crown and the people, by form-
ing a barrier to withstand the encroachments of both. (emphasis added).
Cf 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 312 ("rendered necessary by the great abuses crept into the
practice of franking"). See also SIDNEY, supra note 2, at 390 ("a most necessary curb to the
fury of bad princes, preventing them from bringing destruction upon the people"); 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 547 ("Pontius the Samnite said as truly as bravely to his coun-
trymen, That those arms were just and pious that were necessary, and necessary when there was
no hope of safety by any other way.") (emphasis in original).
Some examples from the constitutional convention:
Mr. Mason observed that the present confederation was not only deficient in not pro-
viding for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States; but argued very cogently
that punishment could not <in the nature of things be executed on> the States collec-
tively, and therefore that such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate on in-
dividuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it.
Mr. Sherman who took his seat to day, admitted that the Confederation had not given
sufficient power to Congs. and that additional powers were necessary....
Notes of Madison (May 30, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 34. See also Notes of Madison
(May 31, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 53 ("This being the end of all our deliberations,
all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.") (speech by
Madison).
Mr. Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved: that the National Ex-
ecutive should be elected by the Executives of the States . . . . If the appointmt.
should be made by the Natl. Legislature, it would lessen that independence <of the
Executive> which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and corruption be-
tween the Executive & Legislature previous to the election, and to partiality in the
Executive afterwards to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode therefore
appeared to him necessary.
Notes of Madison (June 9, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 175.
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One also is puzzled by the manner in which Hamilton and Mar-
shall presented their definitions of "necessary." Hamilton placed
"useful, or conducive to" at the end of a string of adjectives that be-
gan with "needful, requisite." Marshall's formulation mixed "con-
venient and useful" with the very different term, "essential." It is
easy to suspect that both were trying to bury the more controversial
definitions (convenient, useful) amid those less controversial (need-
ful, requisite, essential). If one is initially skeptical of their motives,
one might conclude that they were dissembling.8°
Thus, textual analysis suggests rejection of both the Jeffersonian
and Hamiltonian views. It implies that the truth is somewhere be-
tween those views; but exactly where, textual analysis does not tell
us.
Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan. In this extended Country,
embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would be dangerous to the distant parts to al-
low a small number of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could
always take care to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or weary-
ing their patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased. He
admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number: But he
had also known good produced by an apprehension of it.
Notes of Madison (August 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 252 (observing that Mason
subscribes to a "necessary" measure although it might produce "inconveniences").
80 Hamilton was, on the spectrum of the founding generation's political views, an extreme
consolidationist-hostile to the concept of limited government, and perhaps to republicanism.
At the federal convention, he had proposed a plan for an unlimited national authority, see Notes
of Madison (June 18, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 291-93 (quoting the text of Hamil-
ton's plan), and of the finished Constitution, he admitted: "No man's ideas were more remote
from the plan than his own were known to be." Notes of Madison (September 17, 1787), in 2
Farrand, supra note 2, at 645-46. Moreover, we now know from Hamilton's private papers that
around the time he was promoting the first National Bank, he was carrying on a conscious
campaign to undermine the constitutional limitations on the federal government: One of his
unpublished papers written in September, 1787 (within two weeks of the time the national
convention adjourned on the 17th), reveals him to be looking forward to a Washington presi-
dency in which the national government may "triumph altogether over the state governments
and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the large states into smaller districts."
Alexander Hamilton, Conjectures About the Constitution, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 278.
Marshall can be accused of no bad faith, but his opinion in McCulloch was composed
more than 30 years after his role in the ratification, after long and vicious battles against the
same people who opposed the bank. There are many accounts of the party battles of the time.
Two recent ones that feature Marshall and the battles up to the time of McCulloch are R. KENT
NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 69-302 (2001)
and HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL: 1801-1835 53-75
(1997).
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D. What is the Meaning of "Proper"?
Previous commentators have had only limited success in defining
"proper." We can be reasonably certain that "proper" means some-
thing different from "necessary, '81 but the rest is quite uncertain.
"Proper" (Latin: proprius),82 is related closely to "property" 83
(proprietas).84 The word's earliest definition is "unique to," "peculiar
to"-not common with other things. 85  This is the meaning in the
s See Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 289-91 (providing some examples of distinct
uses of the two words). See also BARNETr, RESTORING, supra note 2, at 185.
There is a multitude of other examples of how the founding generation used "necessary"
and "proper" in contrasting ways. See, e.g., Notes of Madison (May 28, 1787), in 1 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 10 (discussing speech by quoting Rufus King, at the federal convention: "He
urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the Constituents it was unnecessary to
exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the
course of the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions."); Notes of Madison (June
4, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 111 (quoting George Mason: "It is unnecessary, if not
improper, to examine this part of the subject now."); Notes of Madison (June 11, 1787), in I
Farrand, supra note 2, at 202 ("[S]everal members did not see the necessity of the <Resolution>
at all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the Natl. Legisl. unnecessary."); Notes of
Madison (September 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 623 ("Mr Sherman concurred in
the opinion that an address was both unnecessary and improper."); Jonathan Dayton to William
Livingston, Jul. 13, 1787, in Hutson, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 167 (stating, "It is unneces-
sary and would perhaps be improper, to relate here the causes of this delay."); Hugh Hughes, A
Country Man III (December 3, 1787), in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 350 ("A
Necessity or even a Propriety"). See also Notes of Madison (August 4, 1787), in 2 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 235-36:
Mr. <Madison> was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but could never
agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction <however> in the
Constitution unnecessary, and improper; because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the
right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of
residence as conditions of enjoying different privileges of Citizenship: Improper: be-
cause it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution...
See also Notes of Madison (August 13, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 268:
Mr. Wilson & Mr. Randolph moved to strike out "7 years" and insert "4 years," as
the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of Reps. Mr. Wilson said it
was very proper the electors should govern themselves by this consideration; but un-
necessary & improper that the Constitution should chain them down to it.
82 LEWIS & SHORT, supra note 2, at 1472 ("not common with others, one's own, special.
particular, proper"-in opposition to communis).
83 Indeed, the neuter substantive, proprium, can mean property. LEWIS & SHORT, supra
note 2, at 1472.
84 Recall that educated people in the founding generation were devoted to Latin and the
classics, and thoroughly grounded in them, and would have internalized theses connections.
CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT (Harvard University Press 1994). On the Latinate English of the Framers, see
WILLS, supra note 2, at 93; FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (University Press of Kansas 1985), passim.
85 The Institutes of Justinian, familiar to the better-educated founders, often used proprius
in this way: J. INST. 1.14.1 ("Sed et servus proprius testamento cum libertate recte tutor dari
potest"); See also id. at I. 2.12.pr ("Quod in castris adquisierit miles qui in potestate patris est,
neque ipsum patrem adimere posse... sed scilicet proprium eius esse id quod in castris adquis-
ierit."); id. at I. 1.2.pr ("lus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam ius istud non
humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium."); id. at 1.2.1.27 ("Sed si diversae mate-
riae sint et ob id propria species facta sit, forte ex vino et melle mulsum aut ex auro et argento
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phrase, "proper name. ' 86  The founders often used "proper" in this
original sense, as when Roger Sherman argued at the federal conven-
tion that it was "improper" to allow the federal legislature to intrude
into the laws "connected with the states," 87 or when James Wilson
opined that executive exercise of legislative powers was not
"proper." 88  A closely related meaning of the adverb "properly"
(Latin: proprie) was "strictly speaking." This usage appeared not just
in English but in Latin texts popular with the founding generation.89
electrum, idem iuris est.").
86 Id. at: 1. 2.13.1 ("Nominatim autem exheredari quis videtur sive ita exheredetur TITIUS
FILIUS MEUS EXHERES ESTO, sive ita FILIUS MEUS EXHERES ESTO, non adiecto proprio
nomine") (emphasis in original).
87 E.g., Notes of McHenry (May 31, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 60.
88 Notes of Madison (June 1, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 65-66. See also id. at
67 (discussing speech by General Pinckney); Notes of Pierce (June 4, 1787), in I Farrand, supra
note 2, at 109 (quoting Benjamin Franklin); Notes of Madison (June 6, 1787), in I Farrand,
supra note 2, at 139 (speech by Madison); id. at 140 (referencing speech by quoting Dickinson);
Notes of King (June 6, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 144-45 (quoting Dickinson, "It will
require as great Talents, Firmness, & Abilities, to discharge the proper Duties of the Execu-
tive"); Notes of Madison (July 17, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 27 (referencing speech
by Luther Martin, "Mr. L. Martin considered the [proposed Congressional veto of state laws] as
improper & inadmissable. Shall all the laws of the States be sent up to the Genl. Legislature
before they shall be permitted to operate?").
See also Notes of Yates (June 22, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 378-79 (quoting
Hamilton):
A state government will ever be the rival power of the general government. It is
therefore highly improper that the state legislatures should be the paymasters of the
members of the national government. All political bodies love power, and it will of-
ten be improperly attained.
For a similar use of the word by an anti-federalist author, see Brutus, VI, New York Jour-
nal (December 27), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 112 ("Brutus," stating,
"The fear of this, will, it is presumed, restrain the general government, for some time, within
proper bounds ....").
See also Richard Price, Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War with America, and The Debts
and Finances of the Kingdom: with A General Introduction and Supplement (1778), available at
http://www.constitution.org/price/price.txt (last visited Aug. 29, 2004). ("If the former account
is right, the people (that is, the body of independent agents in every community) are their own
legislators. All civil authority is properly their authority.") For similar sentiments by the same
author, see The Evidence for a Future Period of Improvement in the State of Mankind (1787),
available at http://www.constitution.org/price/price.txt (last visited Aug. 29, 2004) ("Free
governments ... give a feeling of dignity and consequence to the governed, and to the gover-
nors a feeling of responsibility which has a tendency to keep them within the bounds of their
duty, and to teach them that they are more properly the servants of the public than its gover-
nors.").
89 J. INST. 3.2.2 ("Per adoptionem quoque adgnationis ius consistit, veluti inter filios
naturales et eos quos pater eorum adoptavit nec dubium est, quin proprie consanguinei appel-
lentur.") (emphasis added); id. at.3.6.3 ("A vunculus est matrisfrater, qui apud Graecos proprie
Pqltp(O appellatur et promiscue OcioqOfti dicitur.") (emphasis added).
Thus, strictly ("properly") speaking, Justinian taught us that a quasi contract was not a
contract. Id. at 3.27.pr ("Post genera contractuum enumerata dispiciamus etiam de his obliga-
tionibus quae non proprie quidem ex contractu nasci intelleguntur, sed tamen, quia non ex
maleficio substantiam capiunt, quasi ex contractu nasci videntur.").
LEWIS & SHORT, supra note 2, at 1472, confirms that "strictly speaking" is one definition
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In an important investigation of the subject, Gary Lawson and
Patricia B. Granger relied on the Founders' use of the earliest sense of
"proper" (without mentioning the Latin) to argue that a "proper" law
was one that respected the legal terrain belonging to the other
branches of government, the states, and the people. 90 That conclusion
may be correct as far as it goes, but substantively, it mostly reaffirms
the rather obvious point that Congress may not pass an unconstitu-
tional law. 9' Moreover, it does not come fully to grips with the fact
that the founding generation commonly-indeed, usually-employed
"proper" and its derivatives in different and broader ways. Adam
Smith had devoted a major part of his influential Theory of Moral
Sentiments to "propriety"-a value that required one to act in ways
duly proportioned and temperate, 92 harmonious, 93  and impartial. 94
of proprie.
90 See generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 2.91 Thus, the federalists represented certain powers as being outside federal jurisdiction,
Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 316-23; cf Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, but this
representation certainly did not depend on the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Another weakness is the lack of contemporaneous pre-ratification evidence for the "juris-
dictional" interpretation. Most of the evidence cited by Professors Lawson and Granger for this
position consists of post-ratification statements-some of it decades after ratification. See
Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, at 291-308. Their pre-ratification evidence is subject to other
interpretations. For example, the extract they cite from the essay by the "Impartial Citzen"-a
federalist writer-is more consonant with a fiduciary meaning of "proper" than with a purely
"jurisdictional" meaning. Id. at 298-99. Cf infra notes 315-319 and accompanying text.
92 SMITH, supra note 2, at 25-26 ("[Rleduce the violence of the passions to that pitch of
moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter into them"); id. at 27 ("The
propriety of every passion excited by objects peculiarly related to ourselves, the pitch which the
spectator can go along with, must lie, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity. If the passion is too
high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it."); id. at 28 ("In the command of those appetites
of the body consists that virtue which is properly called temperance .... But to confine them
within those limits, which grace, which propriety, which delicacy, and modesty require, is the
office of temperance."). Cf. Notes of Madison (June 9, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 179(discussing speech by James Wilson):
[James Wilson] entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation,
stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, cqual
numbers of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives, and different num-
bers of people different numbers of representatives. This principle had been improp-
erly violated in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time.
See Notes of Madison (June 30, 1787), 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 484 (quoting Wilson on
proportionate representation, "if the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with
the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen
on better grounds.").
93 SMITH, supra note 2, at 16 ("When the original passions of the person principally con-
cerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily
appear to this last just and proper .... ); id. at 25:
And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain
our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of
human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments
and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety.
Cf. Notes of Madison (July 17, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 28 ("A power of nega-
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Contemporaries often employed "proper" to mean fair,95
suitable96-- even "expedient" or "convenient."97  Sometimes when
one reads a contemporary statement to the effect that a course was
"proper," one gets the impression that the author simply meant the
course was a good idea.98 Naturally enough, some speakers employed
multiple meanings of "proper" in the same paragraph.99
tiving the improper laws of the States is at once the most mild & certain means of preserving the
harmony of the system.").
94 At least one supporter represented that "partial" government actions, such as chartering
monopolies, would not be invalid because not "proper" under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
An Impartial Citizen V (February 28), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 43 1.
On the value of impartiality to the founding generation, see Natelson, Public Trust, supra
note 2.
95 See, e.g., Notes of Madison (August 13, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 273 (quot-
ing Mason: "the Senate did not represent the people, but the States in their political character. It
was improper therefore that it should tax the people."). Of course, this usage also could be
treated as meaning "proportionate," "suitable," or even "within their proper sphere."
96 See, e.g., Notes of Madison (May 29, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 20 (quoting
resolutions proposed by Randolph: "Resold. that the members of the second branch of the
National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons
nominated by the individual Legislatures."); Notes of Pierce (May 31, 1787), in 1 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 59 ("Mr. Mason was of opinion that it would be highly improper to draw the
Senate out of the first branch; that it would occasion vacancies which would cost much time,
trouble, and expence to have filled up,-besides which it would make the Members too depend-
ent on the first branch."); Notes of King (June 1, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 70-71
(quoting Elbridge Gerry: "I am in favr. of a council to advise the Ex-they will be the organs of
information of the persons proper for offices .... "); Notes of Madison (June 4, 1787), in I
Farrand, supra note 2, at 99 ("<Mr.> M<adison> supposed that if a proper proportion of each
branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same
purpose as an absolute negative."). These are just four of many examples.
97 E.g., Notes of Madison (June 7, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 151 (quoting Wil-
son: "the people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose"); Notes of McHenry
(September 4, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 509 (describing speech of Gerry: "Nor was
this a proper time for such an innovation. The people would not bear it.").
98 See, e.g., Notes of Madison (May 28, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 10 (describ-
ing speech by quoting Rufus King: "He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to
bind the Constituents it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as
changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the business & would fill the minutes
with contradictions."); Notes of Madison (June 1, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 66 ("Mr.
<Madison>-<thought> it would be proper, before a choice shd. be made between a unity and a
plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority .... "). These are just two
of many examples.
99 E.g., Notes of Madison (August 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 249 (describ-
ing speech by Oliver Ellsworth, a member of the committee of detail):
Mr. Elseworth. The different circumstances of different parts of the U.S. and the
probable difference between the present and future circumstances of the whole, ren-
der it improper to have either uniform orfixed qualifications. Make them so high as
to be useful in the S. States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them
to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner what may
be accommodated to the existing State of things among us, may be very inconvenient
in some future state of them. He thought for these reasons that it was better to leave
this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Con-
stitution. (emphases added).
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Samuel Johnson's Dictionary reflected the diversity of meanings
of "proper." The word was defined by ten entries. Five of these were
plainly inapplicable to the Constitution, 1°° but none of the others can
be ruled out textually. The five plausible meanings include two over-
lapping entries partaking of the original restrictive denotation,' 0 ' one
signifying "suitable, one related to Smith's usage ("Exact; accu-
rate; just"), 0 3 and one signifying "original, natural." 1°4
Thus, in interpreting the word "proper," textual analysis can elimi-
nate some possibilities but cannot, unaided, provide us with an au-
thoritative meaning of the word in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
E. What is the Meaning of "And"?
Even the middle word in the phrase "necessary and proper" is open
to dispute. The definition of "necessary" and the definition of
"proper" might depend on (to paraphrase a former President) "what
the meaning of 'and' is." At first glance, "and" appears to be a con-junctive-a law must be "necessary plus proper." But as Professor
Scott Burnham has pointed out, "and" can have a disjunctive meaning
as well. 0 5 One might read the Necessary and Proper Clause as saying
that a law must be necessary or proper.
Such an interpretation would not be unique in the constitutional
text, because in several other parts of the Constitution "and" can be
read as disjunctive. One section provides that, "He [the President]
100 JOHNSON, supra note 2 (unpaginated). They include these definitions:
2. Noting an individual. "A proper name may become common, when given to sev-
eral beings of the same kind; as Caesar. Watts"
7. Not figurative.
8. It seems in Shakespeare to signify, mere; pure.
9. [Propre, Fr.] Elegant; pretty.
10. Tall; lusty; handsome with bulk.
lt Id. The first entry reads: "1. Peculiar; not belonging to more; not common." As an ex-
ample, Johnson quotes Hooker: "As for the virtues that belong unto moral righteousness and
honesty of life, we do not mention them, because they are not proper unto christian men as they
are christian, but do concern them as they are men."
The third entry reads: "3. One's own. It is joined with any of the possessives: as, my
proper, their proper."
1021d. This is the fifth entry: "5. Fit; accommodated; adapted; suitable; qualified."
103 Id. ("6. Exact; accurate; just.").
104 Id. ("4. Natural; original. 'In our proper motion we ascend/Up to our native seat'. Mil-
ton"); cf Notes of Madison (June 7, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 153 (describing speech
by Dickinson: "He compared the proposed National System to the Solar System, in which theStates were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits."); id. at 153-54(quoting Wilson: "Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate
purposes .... ).
105 Sco1r J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS 95 (3d ed. 2003). At
some points, Professor Lynch seems to assume it has a disjunctive meaning. See LYNCH, supra
note 2, at 20 (suggesting that the committee of detail's addition of "proper" accommodated
James Wilson by expanding the scope of federal power).
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shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient."'0 6 Since necessary meas-
ures are, by definition, expedient, treating "and" as conjunctive re-
suits in surplus. What the text must mean is that the President may
recommend measures "he shall judge necessary" and measures "he
shall judge ...expedient." One would expect a chief executive to
recommend both kinds of measures.
Another example of the Constitution's use of a disjunctive "and"
appears in the provision that empowers Congress, "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."'10 7 The final "and" must mean "or." Otherwise, the
drafters would be referring to authors' "Writings and Discoveries"
and inventors' "Writings and Discoveries."
Under what circumstances, might "and" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause be read disjunctively? If one assumes that the term
"necessary" means "absolutely necessary" or nearly so, and that the
term "proper" is relatively weak-signifying something like "suit-
able" or "expedient"-then it would be hard to think of a necessary
law pursuant to legitimate powers that was not also proper. 108 In that
case, the constructional canon against surplus argues in favor of a
disjunctive "and."
Suppose, while keeping a strong meaning for "necessary," we now
select a more restrictive definition for "proper"-for example, if we
read the phrase as requiring that a law be "absolutely necessary and
impartial." As Madison once pointed out, when the text is unclear, it
is fair to test interpretation by the consequences. 10 9 Such an interpre-
tation with a conjunctive "and" would make it very difficult for Con-
gress to conduct national affairs. So this instance of very strict inter-
pretation for "necessary" argues for a disjunctive "and."
Just as the meanings we assign to "necessary" and "proper" help
determine whether "and" is disjunctive or conjunctive, the meaning
we assign to "and" helps determine the meanings of the two adjec-
tives that surround it. Specifically, a disjunctive "and" renders more
plausible an interpretation in which the meanings of both adjectives
are very restrictive. A conjunctive "and" suggests that (1) at least one
'06 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 3 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
108 Cf 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 383 (Chancellor Livingston, speaking at the
New York ratifying convention: "This was undoubtedly proper; for it was necessary to his
argument.").
1092 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1946 (February 2, 1791).
(Vol. 55:2
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of the two is relatively permissive, although (2) not so permissive that
complying with one adjective automatically satisfies the other (as in
"necessary and expedient"). It is clear, though, that the meaning of
"and" cannot be resolved by textual analysis alone.
F. Summary: What We Have Learned-and Not Learned-From
Textual Analysis
Textual analysis has told us that the Necessary and Proper Clause
sets up an objective test, subject to judicial review. Congressional
laws may be enacted only for the purpose of executing powers
granted elsewhere in the Constitution. We do not know, however,
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause is a grant of power, a limi-
tation on power, or a rule of construction only. "Necessary" cannot
mean "indispensable," but we are not sure what it does mean. The
requirement of "propriety" is different from that of "necessity," and
presumably one cannot be a mere subset of the other, particularly if
"and" is conjunctive. Whether "and" is conjunctive or disjunctive
may depend on how restrictive its surrounding adjectives are. If both
are very restrictive, "and" is probably disjunctive. If one or both are
fairly lenient, then "and" is more likely conjunctive.
I1. DRAFTING THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 1o




It has always appeared to me that in making these remarks both
Holmes and Dickinson overstated their case. The life of the law has
been logic as well as experience, and experience without rational ex-
amination is a poor guide. Many animals can recall past experiences.
What gives mankind a decisive edge in nature is an ability to submit
experience to the light of logic and reason.
Nevertheless, logic has limits. The previous Part on textual analy-
sis well demonstrates the point. Understanding the Necessary and
110 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881), Lecture I, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/collections/special/collections/common-law/Lecture01 
.php
(last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
1 Notes of Madison (August 13, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 278.
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Proper Clause requires understanding the relevant experience of the
people who wrote it and ratified it. With that end in mind, we turn to
the drafting of the Clause at the federal constitutional convention.
B. Pinckney and Dickinson
The federal constitutional convention commenced in May, 1787,
and over the next few weeks adopted a series of resolutions that con-
templated a national government of expansive, but rather vague, pow-
ers. 11 During that early period, advocates of a narrower, more de-
fined enumeration were in the minority.'
13
Among the minority was young Charles Pinckney of South Caro-
lina, who submitted a plan for a government of enumerated powers
only.' 14 The Pinckney Plan also incorporated the formula for decen-
tralization set forth in the Articles of Confederation: "Each State re-




12 Committee of Detail, I, in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 131-32:
Resolved that the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover to legislate in all
Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the
States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may
be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.
113 See Natelson, Dickinson, supra note 2, at 472-73 (describing the progress of the con-
vention from undefined to enumerated powers).
14 Committee of Detail, III, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 135-36:
The S. & H. D. in C. ass. [Senate and the House of Delegates in Congress Assem-
bled] shall have the exclusive Power of regulating Trade and levying Imposts-Each
State may lay Embargoes in Time of Scarcity
13. of establishing Post-Offices
14. S. & H. D. in C. ass. shall be the last Resort on Appeal in Disputes between two
or more States; which Authority shall be exercised in the following Manner &c
15. S. & H. D. in C. ass. shall institute Offices and appoint Officers for the Depart-
ments of for. Affairs, War, Treasury and Admiralty-
They shall have the exclusive Power of declaring what shall be Treason & Misp. of
Treason agt. U. S.-and of instituting a federal judicial Court, to which an Appeal
shall be allowed from the judicial Courts of the several States in all Causes wherein
Questions shall arise on the Construction of Treaties made by U. S.-or on the Law
of Nations--or on the Regulations of U. S. concerning Trade & Revenue--or
wherein U. S. shall be a Party-The Court shall consist of Judges to be appointed
during good Behaviour-S. & H. D. in C. ass shall have the exclusive Right of insti-
tuting in each State a Court of Admiralty, and appointing the Judges &c of the same
for all maritime Causes which may arise therein respectively.
16. S & H. D. in C. ass. shall have the exclusive Right of coining Money-regulating
its Alloy & Value-fixing the Standard of Weights and Measures throughout U. S.
"5 Committee of Detail, II, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 135; cf. ARTS. OF CONFED., art
H.
Later in life, Pinckney claimed authorship of a plan that contained something very similar
to the Necessary and Proper Clause, but the latter plan was almost certainly a later invention.
For that plan, the reconstructed original, and discussion, see Appendix D, The Pinckney Plan, in
3 Farrand, supra note 2, at 595-609.
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Another advocate for enumeration was John Dickinson of Dela-
ware, a much more seasoned and influential delegate. In June, Dick-
inson crafted his own scheme for a government featuring enumerated
powers. Interestingly, this plan was unknown to most constitutional
scholars until its publication in 1983.116 It contained a
forerunner-perhaps the embryo-of the Necessary and Proper
Clause: the Legislature of the United States ought to be authorized to
"pass Acts for enforcing" various enumerated powers."' Dickinson
agreed with Pinckney that the new government ought to be limited to
specific objects. Unlike Pinckney, he visualized a role for implied
powers as well.
C. The Committee of Detail
On July 23, 1787, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts offered a mo-
tion to establish a "committee of detail" to organize into a draft con-
stitution all resolutions previously agreed to." 8 The convention ap-
proved Gerry's motion without dissent," 9 and voted to set the number
of committee members at five.' 20 The following day the convention
electedthe membership.' 2' The convention then provided the com-
mittee with copies of its prior resolutions and a copy of the Pinckney
Plan.' 22 There is no written record of the committee having the Dick-
inson Plan, but in view of Dickinson's influence and presence, it is
unlikely the members were ignorant of it. 123
The membership of the committee of detail was carefully balanced
by region, but the roster was significant for another reason as well: It
was laden with legal talent. Only Nathaniel Gorham, former presi-
dent of Congress and chairman of the committee of the
whole124-- likely selected for his political skills125-was not a lawyer.
The other four members were, as the saying goes, Pillars of the Bar.
116 It was published in James H. Hutson, John Dickinson at the Federal Constitutional
Convention, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 256, 262-69 (1983).
17 Hutson, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 89 (emphasis added) ("[Tihe Legislature of the
United States ought to be authorized to pass Acts for enforcing an Observance of the Laws of
Nations and an Obedience to their own Laws-for raising a Revenue by levying Duties ... for
the Regulation of Trade and Commerce.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 86.
1'8 Notes of Madison (July 23, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 86, 95.
19 ld. at 95.
120 Id. at 96.
121 Journal (July 24, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 97.
122 Committee of Detail, I, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 129-37.
123 For Dickinson's influence at the Convention and a discussion of his plan, see Natelson,
Dickinson, supra note 2, at 449-76. It used to be thought that Dickinson was absent from the
convention for over a month. We now know that this was not the case. Id. at 426 n.59.
124 Journal (May 30, 1787), in 11 Farrand, supra note 2, at 29.
125 Cf. LYNCH, supra note 2, at 18-19 (suggesting Gorham was selected to represent the
shipping interests of New England).
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Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph had taken over Thomas Jeffer-
son's clients,126 represented George Washington in his business af-
fairs, 127 and had served as attorney-general of Virginia for ten
years. 28  After the Constitution was ratified, President Washington
would. select Randolph to be the first attorney general of the United
States. 129 John Rutledge of South Carolina had (like Dickinson) been
educated at London's Middle Temple, 30 had served as governor,13' as
the primary drafter of his state's 1776 constitution, 32 and as state
chancellor. 33  Washington would one day place Rutledge on the
United States Supreme Court and unsuccessfully nominate him for
Chief Justice.' 34 James Wilson was a scholarly, Scots-trained Penn-
sylvania lawyer and a former student of Dickinson. 35 As part of the
Connecticut governor's council, Oliver Ellsworth had been a member
of that state's highest court, and at the time of the convention was a
judge of the superior court. 13 6 Like Rutledge, both Wilson and Ells-
worth eventually served on the U.S. Supreme Court-Ellsworth as
Chief Justice. 137 As lawyers, the four represented the elite among a
convention generally notable for the quality of its legal expertise.
38
Another significant aspect of all four men was the nature of their
law practice. Although all had enjoyed long experience in public
service, they were not mere "government lawyers." Each had been an
extremely busy private practitioner, immersed in the normal routine
of the early American attorney: private litigation, business, real es-
tate, wills, trusts, decedent estates, and the issues of agency law that
126 REARDON, supra note 2, at 15.
127 Id. at 73-74.
128 Id. at 34 (discussing Randolph's election to attorney general in 1776); id. at 87 (discuss-
ing Randolph's election to governor in 1786).
129 ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 306.
130Id. at 130-3 1. For Dickinson, see id. at 110; BARRY, supra note 2, at 27.
13 BARRY, supra note 2, at 242.
132 Id. at 191.
133 Id. at 303.
1.4 ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 306.
13 5 See CHARLES PAGE SMITH, supra note 2, at 37 (discussing Dickinson's role as Wilson's
sponsor); id. at 50 (describing Dickinson as Wilson's teacher).
136 BROWN, supra note 2, at 108.
137 ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 306.
138 For example, seven of the fifty-five delegates to the federal convention had been trained
in London's Inns of Court. E. ALFRED JONES, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT
(1924). See id. at 21-22 (John Blair); id. at 61-63 (John Dickinson); id. at 102 (William Hous-
ton); id. at 104 (Jared Ingersoll); id. at 134-3536 (William Livingston); id. at 170-71 (Charles
Pinckney); id. at 171-72 (Charles Cotesworth Pinckney). Other Inns of Court alumni, while not
federal convention delegates, became leading proponents of ratification. See id. at 124-25
(Henry Lee, a federalist speaker at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 216-17 (Alexander
White, author of one of the published enumerations of state powers and a leading federalist
spokesman in Virginia); Biographical Gazetteer, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
525 (Francis Corbin, leading federalist spokesman at the Virginia ratifying convention).
[Vol. 55:2
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arose in those areas of practice. Randolph reputedly had enjoyed the
busiest private practice in Virginia.1 39 Rutledge, who seems to have
been virtually born to the law, was one of the top three practitioners
in Charleston by the 1760s.140 Wilson had been a familiar and fre-
quent figure at the Pennsylvania bar. 141 Ellsworth, in addition to his
judicial duties, had profited from an extremely large practice. His
biographer reports that, despite his public responsibilities, "Through-
out the Revolution, and until the new national government was organ-
ized under the Constitution, he was always either actively in practice
or else on the bench.' ' 142  One can understand why, therefore, these
lawyers-like other key founders-sometimes thought of government
in private law terms.1
43
Whether on their own motion or by previous suggestion, the com-
mittee of detail decided to adopt the Pinckney-Dickinson approach of
enumerating legislative powers rather than stating them broadly.' 44
To at least a pair the committee's members, the process must have
seemed familiar: In 1781, Randolph and Ellsworth had served on the
three-man congressional committee that proposed a detailed enumera-
tion of additional powers for Congress. 45
As the committee got to work, Randolph apparently took the first
swipe at organizing a charter, working either alone or under the direc-
tion of the rest. A crude draft in his handwriting is still extant. The
139 REARDON, supra note 2, at 70. "Enjoyed" is a bit of a stretch, because Randolph
worked himself into a frazzle. See id. at 70-78 (describing Randolph's practice in the years
before the convention).
140 BARRY, supra note 2, at 65. Rutledge's uncle was an influential lawyer, and Rutledge
showed interest early. Id. at 9.
141 See CHARLES PAGE SMITH, supra note 2, at 37, 46, 49, 116-28 (describing Wilson's
large practice).
142 BROWN, supra note 2, at 31. On Ellsworth's large practice, see id. at 30-33.
143 Another example is Edmund Pendleton, the chief judge on Virginia's court of chancery,
and the president of the Virginia ratification convention. One of Pendleton's extant letters
shows him comparing the Constitution's delegation of powers to (a) conveyance of a term of
years, (b) conveyance of a fee tail or life estate, (c) conveyance of a fee simple, and (d) agency.
Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (Jun. 14, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 1625-26.
1'" Committee of Detail, IV, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 142-44.
One writer has argued that the change arose from the personal beliefs of the members of
the Committee of Detail, beliefs not typical of the convention, but which the convention ac-
cepted because of the press of time. John C. Hueston, Note, Altering The Course of the Consti-
tutional Convention: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State
and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L. J. 765 (1990). While not ruling out that possibility, noted
historian Jack N. Rakove suggests the convention may have viewed the sweeping "federal
powers" language in the Virginia Plan as a place-holder for a subsequent, more detailed enu-
meration. RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 177-78. His views have some support from comments
made at the convention. See, e.g., Notes of Madison (May 31, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2,
at 53 (Randolph, disclaiming any intention for indefinite federal powers).
145 21 J. CONT. CONG. 893-96 (1781). The other committee member was James Mitchell
Varnum of Rhode Island. Id. at 896 n. 1.
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draft addresses potential conflicts between state and federal powers in
this way: "All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be
void, and in the decision thereon, which shall be vested in the su-
preme judiciary, all incidents without which the general principles
cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general
principle."'
146
The language was awkward, but its core meaning was clear: (a)
within the federal sphere, inconsistent state laws would be invalid; (b)
the determination as to whether state laws infringed on the federal
sphere would be a question for the judiciary; and (c) in making their
decisions, the courts were to be guided by the common law of princi-
pals and incidents. This provision was a supremacy clause, a grant of
jurisdiction, and an instruction to the courts-all in one.
Rutledge then undertook a revision. Either Rutledge or Randolph
lined out the original wording, and Rutledge replaced it with the
phrase: "and a right to make all Laws necessary to carry the foregoing
Powers into Execu--."'' 47 (The committee later inserted a supremacy
clause in another part of the document. 148) Four years later, Randolph
confirmed that this language, like his original draft, was intended to
incorporate the doctrine of implied incidental powers, drawn from the
law of agency. 149
The committee next added the phrase "and proper." The final
committee draft, extant in Wilson's hand with emendations by
Rutledge, was very similar to the Necessary and Proper Clause in the
finished Constitution. It read: "And to make all laws that shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-
ers, and all other powers vested, by this Constitution, in the govern-
ment of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."' 50
145 Committee of Detail, IV, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 144.
147 Id. at 144.
148 Committee of Detail, IX, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 169:
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance of this Constitu-
tion, and all Treaties made under the Authority of the United States shall be the su-
preme Law of the several States, and of their Citizens and Inhabitants; and the
Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their Decisions, any Thing in
the Constitutions or Laws of the several States to the Contrary notwithstanding.
This clause later became U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
149 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President
Washington, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at 89. See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
150 Notes of Madison (August 2, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 182.
[Vol. 55:2
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The committee members' notes do not tell us why they added the
words "and proper." Wilson had been dallying with a clause in the
New Jersey Plan that would have granted Congress authority to raise
revenue, "to be applied to such foederal [sic] Purposes as they shall
deem proper and expedient. " 5 1 Professor Joseph M. Lynch contends
that this was the source of "and proper."' 52 Another possibility is that
the words were adapted from the Northwest Ordinance, which had
authorized the governor and judges of the "Territory of the United
States northwest of the River Ohio" to enact "such laws of the origi-
nal States, criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to
the circumstances of the district."' 5 3 We shall see, however, that "and
proper" more likely had the same agency law origin as "necessary."'
' 54
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF INCIDENTAL AGENCY POWERS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
A. Why the Drafters Resorted to Agency Law
As noted in the last Part, the four lawyers on the committee of de-
tail all had practiced extensively in the private sector, where they
dealt with agency arrangements and employed agency agreements.
They, together with the rest of the founders, had a stubborn way of
thinking of public officials as "agents" (or servants, guardians or trus-
tees) of the people. The proceedings of the federal convention con-
tain repeated references by delegates-including, specifically, Wilson
and Ellsworth-to officials or branches of government as the people's
agents. ' 55 Similar references pepper the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion speeches of Edmund Randolph, 56 the Federalist Papers, 57 and
'51 Committee of Detail, VII, in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 157 (emphasis added).
152Thus, he states that "the committee adopted the substance of Wilson's suggestion."
LYNCH, supra note 2, at 20. This is not really correct, however, because although the commit-
tee inserted the word "proper," it rejected the bulk of the New Jersey Plan clause, "such foederal
[sic] Purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient." Committee of Detail, VII, in 2 Far-
rand, supra note 2, at 157. Unlike the language adopted, the New Jersey Plan clause would
have granted Congress nearly plenary power. Cf supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text and
infra note 162 and accompanying text.
153 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, §5 (1787), available at
http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlnworder.htm (emphasis added).
154 Infra Part IV(D).
155 E.g., Notes of Madison (August 11, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 260 ("Mr.
Wilson [referring to Congress] thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper.
The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be
in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings."); Notes of Madison (August 22,
1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 377 ("Mr. Elsworth argued that they were unnecessary. The
U-S-- heretofore entered into Engagements [i.e., debts] by Congs who were their Agents.
They will hereafter be bound to fulfil them by their new agents.").
'56 E.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 70-71 ("A less degree will defeat the inten-
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many other contemporary political documents. 158  Concomitant with
the analogy between public officials and agents (or servants, guardi-
ans or trustees) was the notion that public officials were subject to
fiduciary norms similar to those imposed in the private sector. 159  I
was not surprised to learn, therefore, that the committee of detail ap-
parently drew the wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause from
contemporary agency forms. My only surprise was finding that
commentators have not recognized this earlier--especially since at
the North Carolina ratifying convention James Iredell (later associate
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) explicitly drew the connection
between a private power of attorney and the Article I, Section 8 list of
congressional powers.
160
In the eighteenth century, an English or American power of attor-
ney often was called a "letter of attorney." It customarily outlined
specific powers granted the agent, and then bestowed incidental pow-
ers according to one of three common formulae. The first of these
granted the agent all powers that the principal might execute if he or
she were present.161 The second gave the agent the power to act as
the agent deemed needful, necessary, fit, proper, meet, or words of
like import.162  The third formula was more objective in nature, and
tion, and a greater will subject the people to the depravity of rulers, who, though they are but the
agents of the people, pervert their powers to their emoluments and ambitious views."); id. at 117
("It has too often happened that powers delegated for the purpose of promoting the happiness of
a community have been perverted to the advancement of the personal emoluments of the agents
of the people ....").
157 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 14, supra note 2, at 63 (James Madison) (stating that Con-
gress is to be the people's "representatives and agents"); id. No. 46, at 243 (James Madison)
("The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people ...."); id. No. 78, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) ("If there should happen to be an irrec-
oncilable variance between the two.., the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.").
158 See generally Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2 (outlining the repeated characteriza-
tion, during the founding generation, of republican officials as the people's agents, guardians,
and trustees). See also BARNETr, RESTORING, supra note 2, at 72-73 (identifying the founders'
belief in an agency theory of government).
1591d. at 1095-1168.
1604 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 148. See also id. at 166 (repeating same argu-
ment).
161 See, e.g., COCKER, supra note 2, at 36 ("in as large and ample a manner as I might do").
This book is in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and was used
in an American lawyer's practice.
162 See, e.g., COCKER, supra note 2, at 38 (as "shall be until my said Attorney thought fit to
be done"); VADE MECUM, supra note 2, at 53 (as the agent "shall think fit and expedient") (a
"vade mecum" is a student's handbook; the Latin expression means "Walk with me.");
SCRIVENER'S GuIDE, supra note 2, at 146-47 ("which... shall to my said Attorney seem fit to
be done") (called by the author "a very General Letter of Attorney"). All three of these books
are in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and were used in an
American lawyer's practice.
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therefore arguably more restrictive, since there was less focus on the
agent's discretion. There is an extremely close linguistic fit between
provisions following the third formula and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. One can see this by examining a few common clauses fol-
lowing the third formula:
" "and also to do, execute and perform all other Things
whatsoever, which are necessary and proper, in and
about the executing of these Presents, according to
the Tenor and true Intention thereof."
163
* "to enter into and execute [all documents] as shall be
necessary or proper"164
* "and also to execute and perform all other Things
whatsoever, that shall be necessary or fit in and about
the Execution of these Presents, according to the
Tenor and true Intent thereof."'1
65
* "to do and perform all Things requisite and necessary
to be done in and about the Execution of these Pre-
sents"'
166
See also POCKET-BOOK, supra note 2, at 171 ("as my said Attorney shall think fit") & 175
("in such Manner as my said Attorney shall think fit") and Howard, supra, 2 H. BI. at 625, 126
Eng. Rep. at 741 ("as ... shall be thought adviseable [sic] and proper") & 2 H. BI. at 626, 126
Eng. Rep. at 742 ("as ... shall seem meet"). See also EDWARD WOOD, A COMPLEAT BODY OF
CONVEYANCING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 124 (1749) ("in Case the same shall be thought
necessary and proper to make such Conveyance") (articles of agreement). See also
ANONYMOUS, THE LAWYER'S LIBRARY: A NEW BOOK OF INSTRUMENTS 102 (2d. 1710) [here-
inafter NEW BOOK] ("which my said Attorney shall think meet"); id. at 104 ("as he shall think
fit"); ORLANDO BRIDGMAN, CONVEYANCES: BEING SELECT PRECEDENTS OF DEEDS AND
INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING THE MOST CONSIDERABLE ESTATES IN ENGLAND 23 (1702) ("and
to do all and every Act, Matter, and thing whatsover, that may be necessary and convenient for
making as many good and lawful entries, as he shall think fit").
The fifth edition of this book is in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, since it was used in an American lawyer's practice.
163 SCRIVENER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 158 (emphasis added). See also GILBERT
HORSMAN, PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING 243 (1744) ("and for that Purpose for me, and in
my Name, and as my Act and Deed to make, seal, deliver and execute any Lease or Leases, or
other lawful Deeds or Instruments whatsoever, to any Person or Persons whomsoever as shall be
necessary and proper in that Behalf") (emphasis added).
164 Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. BI. 618, 625, 126 Eng. Rept. 737, 741 (1796) (emphasis added).
Cf. SCRIVENER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 160 ("necessary or expedient").
165 SCRIVENER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 157.
166 POCKET-BOOK, supra note 2, at 173. See also COMPLEAT CLERK, supra note 2, at 473
("requisite and necessary"), also in the same library for the same reason. The same wording
appears in SCRIVENER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 156. See also VADE MECUM, supra note 2, at
49 ("requisite and needful").
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" "to do, execute and accomplish all and whatsoever
shall be needful and necessary to be done in or about
the Premises"'
167
* "to execute, seal and deliver such Conveyances and
Assurances of the said Premisses [sic] ... as shall be
needful and requisite for the doing thereof ... grant-
ing unto my said Attorney full Power and absolute
Authority to do, execute and perform any Act or
Acts, Thing or Things whatsoever, that shall be need-
ful and necessary to be done."'
168
The fact that the drafters rejected the more subjective first and sec-
ond formulae in favor of the third further confirms the textual conclu-
sion that congressional discretion was to be reviewable judicially. 169
Incidentally, the Constitution was by no means the only eighteenth
century political document to adopt similar language from the law of
agency, although most of the ones I have seen adopted the broader,
second formula.17
0
167 POCKET-BOOK, supra note 2, at 174; VADE MECUM, supra note 2, at 49 ("needful and
necessary"); COCKER, supra note 2, at 38 ("necessary and needful").
168 POCKET-BOOK, supra note 2, at 174-75. Many other examples appear in NEW BOOK,
supra note 162. See, e.g., id. at 91 ("to do and perform all and whatsoever shall be needful or
requisite"); 92 ("whatsoever ... shall be needful, necessary or convenient to be done"); 126
("needful or necessary"); 131 ("needful or requisite"); 178 ("necessary or convenient"). The
last appears in a trust form, thereby highlighting the fiduciary connection between trust and
agency law. See also JOB MILL, THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING 238 (1745) (em-
powering a trustee in a bargain and sale deed) ("and every Part thereof, as shall be needful,
necessary and proper").
See also COMPLEAT CLERK, supra note 2, at 478 ("like power and authority to do all acts
and things, to be needfull [sic] to be done") (a letter of substitution rather than a letter of attor-
ney) and SCRIVENER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 137 ("to do and execute all and every Matter and
Thing necessary to be done"), 138 ("and generally to do and perform all other Matters neces-
sary"), 145, 149 & 153 ("needful and necessary"), 151 ("needful"), 152 ("expedient").
169 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
170 See, e.g., An Act for Draining and Preserving Certain Fen Lands and Low Grounds in
the Parishes of Somersham and Pidley with Fenton, and the Parish of Colne, in the County of
Huntington (one of many such Parliamentary acts, empowering commissions to spend as much
money for maintenance and other services as they "shall judge necessary or proper"), and An
Act for Dividing and Inclosing the Open and Common Fields, Common Meadows, and Com-
monable Lands, within the Parish of Longmarston, in the County of Gloucester, in 2 William
Newnam, THE COMPLETE CONVEYANCER 517, 520 (1786) ("as they shall judge necessary and
proper"). See also LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF SAID
STATE AT THEIR ELEVENTH SESSION 107 (1788) ("as to them shall appear necessary and
proper"). Id. at 183 ("as they shall deem it necessary and proper").
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B. Evolution of the Incidental Agency Doctrine to the Founding Era
English courts of law and equity had developed their agency juris-
prudence from the law of master and servant, 71 bailments, 172 and
property' 73 -and most particularly from the Roman law of mandate.
Mandate was a gratuitous relationship174 in which a principal author-
ized an agent to undertake an act or assume a course of management.
The relation was consensual on both sides, 175 and continued to exist
only while consent remained. 176 The duties of agent to principal un-
der the jurisprudence of mandate will be familiar to anyone knowl-
edgeable about modem agency law: The agent was required to re-
main within the scope of the agency. 77 Mandates for immoral pur-
poses were void. 178 The agent was bound to the principal by obliga-
tions of good faith 179 and loyalty. 180  Conflicts of interest between
agent and principal were discouraged.' 81 The agent had a duty of
care182 and a duty to account to the principal. 183 When the agent was
working on behalf of more than one person, that agent had an obliga-
tion to act impartially.' 84 If the mandate did not direct to the contrary,
the agent enjoyed an implied power-a choice of methods for obtain-
171 PALEY, supra note 2, at 118. See also Randal v. Harvey, Godb. 358, 359, 78 Eng. Rep.
211 (K.B. 1623) (referring to incidental power of a pipe-layer to dig).
172E.g., Clarke v. Perrier, 2 Eq. Cal. Abr. 707, 22 Eng. Rep. 594 (Ch. 1679) (referring to
bailment law). See also 1 LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 333.
173 1 LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 105-06 (citing various examples of property convey-
ances by attorneys in fact, including commentary in Co. Litt. 52b and Slaning's Case, Poph.
102, 103, 79 Eng. Rep. 1212 (K.B. 1595); Brent's Case, 3 Dyer 339b, 340a, 73 Eng. Rep. 766
(K.B. 1574); and Hill v. Granger, 2 Dyer 130b, 131a, 73 Eng. Rep. 284, 286 (K.B. 1554-55)).
See also Randal, Godb. 358, 359, 78 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B. 1623) (referring to incidental convey-
ance of right to use nets when conveying all fish in a pond).
174 DIG. 17.1.4 (Gaius, Rerum Cottidianarum 2).
175 DIG. 17.1.1 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32) ("Obligatio mandati consensu contrahentium con-
sistit."); 2 JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, supra note 2, at 479 ("The obligation of the agency rests on the
consent of the contracting parties.").
176 However, withdrawal could require notice. DIG. 17.1.22.11 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32); 2
JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, supra note 2, at 487.
177 See DIG. 17.1.5.pr, -5.1 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32); DIG. 17.1.41 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Prou-
inciale 3). Cf J. INST. 3.26.8 ("Is qui exsequitur mandatum non debet excedere fines mandati."
That is, "He who carries out a mandate should not exceed the borders of the mandate.") (au-
thor's translation).
178 DIG. 17.1.6.3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 31); see also DIG. 17.1.22.6 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32).
179 DIG. 17.1.8.10 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 31); see also DIG. 17.1.10pr (Ulpian, Ad Edictum
31).
180 See DIG. 17.1.6.6 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 31); DIG. 17.1.8.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 31).
I1 DIG. 17.1.7 (Papinian, Responsorum 3).
182 1 LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 336-39 (discussing the views of several Roman jurists
on the duty of care and comparing those with common law duty imposed on agents when under-
taking tasks related to professional skills).
183 See DIG. 17.1.10.3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 31); DIG. 17.1.42 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 11).
184 DIG. 17.1.35 (Neratius, Membranarum 5); DIG. 17.1.36pr, 36.1 (Javolenus, Ex Cassio
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ing the goals of the mandate. In the words of the Roman jurist Pau-
lus:
[A]s long as the mandate is for something definite, there
should be no departure from its scope; but whenever [it is]
indefinite or [deals with] more than one matter, then, even
though the terms of the mandate were discharged by acts
other than those included in the mandate itself, yet provided
that this was in the mandator's interest, [si tamen hoc manda-
tori expedierit] there will be an action on mandate [i.e., the
185
agent may sue for reimbursement].
When the English courts incorporated this doctrine of agency dis-
cretion into their own jurisprudence, it was, of course, recast into
English legal terms. The agent's implied powers were thought of as a
branch of the doctrine of principals and incidents.
An "incident" was a right, power, or characteristic of a larger legal
concept (the principal) that the law presumed adhered to the principal.
The principal could be an interest in land, such as a reversion; or a
license, such as a corporate charter; or an agency arrangement. Law-
yers generally did not determine the scope of a principal by focusing
on the incidents. Rather, the usual procedure was to fix the nature
and scope of the incidents from the nature of the principal.1 86  Once
one knew the principal, the incidents followed it by-to use a com-
mon eighteenth century phrase 187-"necessary consequence.",
188
185 DiG. 17.1.46 (Paul, Ad Edictum 74):
[QJuotiens certum mandatum sit, recedi a forma non debeat: at quotiens incertum
uel plurium causarum, tunc, licet aiis praestationibus exsoluta sit causa mandati
quam quae ipso mandato inerant, si tamen hoc mandatori expedierit, mandati erit
actio.
Mark the use of the Latin forebear of the word "expedient"-meaning in this case expedient for
the principal.
86 This is not invariably true. For example, in so-called "fee vs. easement" cases (better
called "possessory interest vs. easement" cases), courts frequently try to determine whether a
possessory interest or an easement has been created by examining the incidents of the interest.
The incidents help determine which category the interest fits into. See, e.g., Machado v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 284 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1991).
187 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 55 ("so necessary a consequence"); id. at 63 ("neces-
sary consequence"); id. at 218 (same); id. at 409 (same); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 209
(same); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 78 ("the consequence necessarily follows"); id. at 171
("necessary consequence"); Notes of Madison (June 5, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 119
("Mr. Wilson opposed the appointmt <of Judges by the> national Legisl: Experience shewed the
impropriety of such appointmts. by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were
the necessary consequences.").
This meaning of "necessary" was the subject of the second and third entries in Johnson's
dictionary: "2. Not free; fatal; impelled by fate. 3. Conclusive; decisive by inevitable conse-
quence." JOHNSON, supra note 2 (unpaginated).
188 Cf 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 337 ("a trust-estate either when expressly declared
or resulting by necessary implication").
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They accompanied the principal just as, as in Latin a citizen's neces-
sarius, a close associate, accompanied the citizen.' 
89
How the founding generation thought of this consequent form of
"necessary" has been described by historian Garry Wills: "It was the
proudest boast of the world opened by Newton's Principia that men
could discern necessity at work, invariable, in the flow of apparent
chance .... Out of a sequence of observed results, a pattern emerges,
and is stated as a law."'190
Anterior to the law of agency, an incident was deemed a necessary
consequent to the principal' 91 in at least three different situations.
First, a thing was an incident if it was indispensable to the principal.
Thus, Blackstone observed that the grazing rights known as "com-
mons appendant" were inseparable incidents of certain lands because:
[Wihen lords of manors granted out parcels of land to ten-
ants, for services either done or to be done, these tenants
could not plough or manure the land without beasts; these
beasts could not be sustained without pasture; and pasture
could not be had but in the lord's wastes, and on the unin-
closed fallow grounds of themselves and the other tenants.
The law therefore annexed this right of common, as insepa-
rably incident, to the grant of the lands; and this was the
original [sic] of common appendant. 192
Second, even if not absolutely necessary, a thing might be an inci-
dent if without it the principal might suffer great damage. This is one
species of what we might call reasonable necessity. Blackstone
again: "But deer in a real authorized park, fishes in a pond, doves in a
189 LEWIS & SHORT, supra note 2, at 1195. Cf 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 434 (call-
ing interest on loans "the necessary companion of commerce").
'90 WILLS, supra note 2, at 94.
'91 Cf 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, 347 ("A subject's grant shall be construed to include
many things, besides what are expressed, if necessary for the operation of the grant.")
192 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 33. Compare the treatment of fealty and rent:
And hence the usual incidents to reversions are said to be fealty and rent. When no
rent is reserved on the particular estate, fealty however results of course [i.e., of ne-
cessity], as an incident quite inseparable ... being frequently the only evidence that
the lands are holden at all. Where rent is reserved, it is also incident, though not in-
separably so, to the reversion. The rent may be granted away, reserving the rever-
sion; and the reversion may be granted away, reserving the rent; by special words:
but by a general grant of the reversion, the rent will pass with it, as incident there-
unto; though by the grant of the rent generally, the reversion will not pass. The inci-
dent passes by the grant of the principal, but not e converso: for the maxim of law is,
"accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur, suum principale."
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 176 (emphasis in original). See also I COKE, supra note
2, at folio 93a.
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dove-house, &c, though in themselves personal chattels, yet they are
so annexed to and so necessary to the well-being of the inheritance,
,193that they shall accompany the land wherever it vests ....
Third, common practice could make up for a low level of necessity
and create at least a "separable" incident. Thus, Blackstone pointed
out that common usage justified the seal and by-laws as incidents of a
corporation sole, even though the necessity was slight. 94
Initially, the courts may have required that for an incidental agency
power to be implied, it had to be indispensably necessary to carry out
the express powers. In Randal and Harvey's Case,195 decided by
King's Bench in 1623, Randal had given Harvey a power of attorney
to "demand, receive, and recover" a debt that one Brown owed to
Randal. Harvey arranged for the debtor's-arrest of Brown. Subse-
quently, however, Harvey engaged to pay Brown's debt if Randal
would agree to Brown's release. Randal so agreed, but then sued
Harvey when Brown did not pay.
Harvey argued that his promise to pay Brown's debt was unen-
forceable for lack of consideration. He contended that his arrest of
Brown had not been authorized by the power that Randal had given
him. Because the arrest was invalid, when Randal agreed to its ter-
mination, he was not giving up any legal right. Randal, on the other
hand, argued that as a means of collecting the debt, ordering the arrest
was a valid exercise of the agent's implied authority. The report of
the case cites two earlier examples of incidental powers: first, when
one grants the fish in one's pond, one also grants the right to catch
them with nets; second, when one authorizes the laying of pipes
through one's land, he also grants the right to dig there.
Chief Justice Ley was of the opinion that the arrest was valid be-
cause the agent had authority to choose between two means of collec-
tion: arrest or declaration of outlawry. The other judges seem to have
accepted the defendant's argument that in the former cases of inciden-
tal powers, "the one thing cannot be done without the other, viz. the
fish cannot be taken without nets; but in this case, the partie might
have come by his money by outlawrie, and so there needed no arrest-
ing of the partie."' 196 In other words, an incidental power was implied
only if indispensable.
193 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 427-28.
941 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 464 ("[Flor two of them, though they may be prac-
tised. yet are very unnecessary to a corporation sole; viz. to have a corporate seal to testify his
sole assent, and to make statutes for the regulation of his own conduct.").
195 Godb. 358, 78 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B. 1623).
196Randal, Godb. at 359, 78 Eng. Rep. at 211.
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Yet about the same time, Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) suggested
that reasonable necessity could be sufficient to justify an incidental
power. His view was thus summarized by a later commentator:
[A] general bailiff of a manor may make leases at will with-
out any special authority; the reason assigned for which in the
books is, because great prejudice and inconvenience would
ensue to the lord by absence, sickness, or other incapacity, if
he had not that power.
197
Certainly by the eighteenth century, a power could be implied as
incidental even without reasonable necessity. Customary usage was
sufficient. In 1701, Lord Holt, one of the more notable of England's
chief justices, held that a factor had implied authority to extend credit
on behalf of his principal, if such was the custom in the factor's busi-
ness. If such was not the custom, the factor had no such authority.
198
Similarly, Ekins v. MacKlish, 99 decided by chancery in 1753, held
that a general factor who endorsed and sold a bill of exchange acted
within the scope of implied authority because he had complied with
the custom of the industry. 2°
In 1776, the Court of King's Bench reaffirmed, and perhaps
strengthened, incidental agency powers. Moore v. Mourgue20 was a
suit by a merchant against his London agent, whom he had directed to
insure a cargo of fruit, but had not instructed how or with whom. The
agent purchased from an established insurance company, The London
Insurance-Office, a policy with an exception for "particular average,"
a kind of partial loss due to unavoidable accident. The agent could
have acquired a policy from either of two other established insurance
offices and thereby avoided the exception. When part of the cargo
was lost, the insurance company invoked the exception and denied
liability. The merchant claimed the agent had violated his duty by not
acquiring a broader policy. The case went to a jury, which was in-
structed by Chief Justice Mansfield (perhaps the greatest of eight-
eenth century judges) to find for the defendant-agent if the jury con-
cluded the agent had acted with due care and in good faith. On appeal
to the full bench, Mansfield announced a unanimous decision sustain-
ing the jury and his own instructions.
197 PALEY, supra note 2, at 137.
198 See Anonymous, 12 Mod. 514, 88 Eng. Rep. 1487 (K.B. 1701).
199Ambler 184, 27 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch. 1753).
200 See also PALEY, supra note 2, at 149 ("In the absence of particular instructions, a gen-
eral power to sell implies a power to sell in the usual way."); 15 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 312 (1751) (usage creates implied authority).
201 2 Cowp. 479, 98 Eng. Rep. 1197 (K.B. 1776).
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The plaintiff, if he pleased, might have given orders to the de-
fendant not to insure at the London Insurance-Office, but at
some other office where this exception would not have been
insisted on. But he gave no directions at all. Therefore he
left it to the discretion of his correspondent who, if he meant
no fraud, was at liberty to elect between the underwriters.2 °2
Moore brought English doctrine completely in line with the old
Roman rule. Samuel Livermore's treatise on agency referenced the
Roman rule in summarizing English law this way:
When the business, which makes the object of the agency,
may, with advantage to the principal, be done in two or more
different ways, the agent may in general do either, provided a
particular mode has not been prescribed to him.
203
Consequently, when the constitutional convention met in 1787, the
doctrine of implied incidental powers allowed an agent to exercise
considerable discretion. Yet the term of art for the doctrine remained
the word necessary. This is apparent from the explanation by Attor-
ney General Randolph, while discussing the Necessary and Proper
Clause in his 1791 opinion on the proposed national bank: "To be
necessary is to be incidental, or, in other words, may be denominated
the natural means of executing a power. ' ,204 It also is apparent from a
reading of Howard v. Baillie,20 5 decided by King's Bench nine years
after the convention met.
In Howard, an executrix had endowed two attorneys in fact with
express powers to conduct the business of the estate, including the
power to pay debts. The agents entered into an agreement to settle a
debt of the estate, which the executrix claimed was beyond their
power. The court held that the agents had implied authority to do
what they did:
[I]t will also be found, without the assistance of general
words, that an authority of this nature necessarily includes
medium powers, which are not expressed. By medium pow-
ers, I mean all the means necessary to be used, in order to at-
tain the accomplishment of the object of the principal power,
202 Moore, 2 Cowp. at 480-81,98 Eng. Rep. at 1198.
203 1 LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 103-04 (citing DIG. 17.1.46 (Paul, Ad Edictum 74) for
support).
204 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President
Washington, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at 89.
2052 H. BI. 618, 126 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ch. 1796).
[Vol. 55:2
HeinOnline  -- 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 282 2004-2005
2004] AGENCY LAW ORIGINS OF NEC. AND PROP. CLAUSE 283
which in this case is the paying, satisfying and discharging
the testator's debts .. . .These and many other subordinate
powers, though not expressly given.., must be understood to
be included in this power to pay debts; and I take it to be
clear that in the construction of such powers they are in-
cluded. Our books say that these kind of authorities are to be
pursued strictly ... But our books also say, that they are to be
so construed as to include all the necessary means of execut-
ing them with effect.
20 6
In the early nineteenth century, some authors tried to capture the
doctrine of incidental powers more precisely by adding other terms or
qualifiers to the word "necessary." In his 1812 treatise on agency,
William Paley wrote: "An authority is to be so construed as to include
all necessary or usual means of executing it with effect. 2 °7 At an-
other point, Paley added that an agent could undertake actions that
were "necessary to effectuate the object in the best manner, " 208 and at
still another, he characterized implied powers as "usually incident to
,,209or necessary. In his own treatise on agency, Justice Joseph Story
used the term "necessary and proper" when defining the doctrine of
incidental powers. 210 However, at the time of the Founding, it was the
word "necessary" alone that connoted a legally incident power. The
term "proper," as we shall see, served other purposes.
C. Summary of the Incidental Agency Doctrine During the
Founding Era
During the Founding Era, if a principal granted an agent express
powers, then in absence of direction or custom to the contrary, the
principal also granted the right to carry out the express powers by:
206 Howard, 2 H. BI. at 619-20, 126 Eng. Rep. at 738 (emphasis added). See also 1
LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 105 (citing much older cases, particularly examples of convey-
ances by attorneys in fact: Slaning's Case, Poph. 102, 103, 79 Eng. Rep. 1212 (K.B. 1596);
Brent's Case, 3 Dyer 339b, 340a, 73 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1574); and Hill v. Granger, 2 Dyer
130b, 131a, 73 Eng. Rep. 284, 286 ( K.B. 1554-55); and citing to Coke's commentary on Little-
ton, § 52b).
207 PALEY, supra note 2, at 137 (emphasis added).
2081d. at 147-48 (emphasis added). See also id. at 146 ("But insasmuch as a power to do
any act comprizes a power to do all such subordinate acts as are usually incident to or are neces-
sary to effectuate the principal act in the best and most convenient manner.").
209 Id. at 146.
210 STORY, supra note 2, at 74 ("And not only are the means necessary and proper for the
accomplishment of the end included in the authority, but also all the various means, which are
justified or allowed by the usages of trade."). See also id. at 81 ("necessary and proper"); id. at
89 ("usual and appropriate").
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" Performing an act indispensable to exercising an ex-
press power (absolute necessity);
* Performing an act necessary to prevent "great preju-
dice"-that is, an act without which execution of the
express powers would be difficult (reasonable neces-
sity); and
* Selecting among alternative methods of performing
an express power, especially if the alternative se-
lected was a customary method (implication by us-
age).
D. Inference as to the Role of "and Proper"
The conclusion that the wording of the Necessary and Proper
Clause was drawn from contemporary agency law enables us to infer
what the committee of detail meant by "proper." By the time of the
Founding, the courts had adopted enough of the Roman law of man-
date that an agent's "necessary" actions were constrained by fiduciary
obligations. An agent was required to act, not only within the scope
of authority, 21' but also in good faith,21 2 while maintaining undivided
loyalty to the principal,213 accounting to the principal,214 and using
211 Clarke v. Perrier, 2 Eq. Cal. Abr. 707, 22 Eng. Rep. 594 (Ch. 1679); KNIGHTLY
D'ANVERS, 1 A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 609 (2d. ed. 1725). This vol-
ume is in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, since it was used in
an American lawyer's practice.
See also DIG. 17.1.5 pr.-5.1 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32) ("Diligenter igiturfines mandati cus-
todiendi sunt: nam qui excessit, aliud quid facere uidetur et, si susceptum non impleuerit, tene-
tur."); 2 JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, supra note 2, at 480 ("Consequently, the limits placed on the
mandate [i.e., agency agreement] must be scrupulously observed, for a man who has gone
beyond them is held to do something other [than he was charged to do], and if he does not carry
out the task he has undertaken, he is liable [i.e., to his principal]."); DIG. 14.3.11.5 (Ulpian, Ad
Edictum 28) ("Condicio autem praepositionis seruanda est: quid enim si certa lege vel interu-
entu cuiusdam personae uel sub pignore uoluit cum eo contrahi uel ad certain rem? aequis-
simum erit id seruari, in quo praepositus est."); 1 JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, supra note 2, at 424:
The terms of the appointment should be respected. For example, the person making
the appointment may have wished the manager to enter transactions only on certain
terms or with the approval of a particular person or if security was given or only
within a certain limit. The fairest thing is to abide by the terms of the appointment.
These prescriptions and others like them were cited by Justice Story in his treatise on
agency some decades later. STORY, supra note 2, at 83 and passim (2d ed. 1844).212 See Moore 2 Cowp. 479, 98 Eng. Rep. 1197.
2l3 PALEY, supra note 2, at 9 ("[A]n agent cannot make himself an adverse party to his
principal.").214 Id. at 40-41.
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"diligence and care in the execution of his trust." 215 If an agent repre-
sented more than one person, he was obliged to remain impartial
among them.216 A natural way to express such constraints was to say
that an agent's actions had to be "proper.,
21 7
Consider the following example:
A Principal, P, is in the widgets business. P charges an agent,
A, with insuring goods. A has a choice among three estab-
lished (customary) insurance providers: Company X, Com-
pany Y, and Company Z. Unfortunately, Company X has its
own widgets division, which is in fierce competition with P.
Company Y's proffered insurance contract is much less fa-
vorable to P than the others.21 8 Under the incidental powers
doctrine, the agent could select Company X, Company Z, or
perhaps Company Y. However, because of the agent's fidu-
ciary duties of loyalty and care, only the selection of Com-
pany Z would be "proper."
A similar interpretation of the phrase "and proper" in the Congres-
sional context would mean that while acting within its incidental
powers, Congress must also honor fiduciary obligations of care, im-
partiality, and the rest.
V. CONFIRMATION OF THE AGENCY LAW MEANING OF THE CLAUSE:
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
As already observed, the founding generation viewed government
officials as agents and fiduciaries. 219 Further, it was standard Whig
theory that governmental violations of fiduciary standards were ultra
vires-and thus outside government's proper sphere.220  The four
215 Id. at 4. Cf id. at 8 ("the mere absence of fraud or bad motive, is not sufficient to jus-
tify an act detrimental to the employer's interest, unless it is sanctioned by the usual course of
business"). See also Russell v. Palmer, 2 Wils. K.B. 325, 95 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B. 1767);
Moore, Cowp. 479, 98 Eng. Rep. 1197 (K.B. 1776); 1 LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 331-74
(describing at length gratuitous and paid agents' duties of care).2 16 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. For the eighteenth century fiduciary ideals
of impartiality, see Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1097-1123 & 1150-58.
217 See Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. BI. 618,625 126 Eng. Rep. 737, 741 (Ch. 1796) (indicating
repeated use of the word "proper" in the letter of attorney reproduced in Howard, 2 H. BI. 618,
625, 126 Eng. Rept. 737, 741 (1796)).
218 Presumably the disparity had to be greater than in Moore, 2 Cowp. 479, 98 Eng. Rep.
1197 (K.B. 1776).219 See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
22
0 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND
VIRTUE IN TWO TREATISES 192 (Wolfgang Leidhold ed. 2004) (1725) ("So that whenever the
Governours openly profess a Design of destroying the State or act in such manner as will neces-
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lawyers who drafted the clause at the federal convention would have
been aware of fiduciary concerns, because they all knew their equity
jurisprudence. All four were among the most respected and knowl-
edgeable attorneys in their home states, 221 and one of them-John
Rutledge-was the chancellor of South Carolina, that is, the chief
222
equity officer of the state. In this context, they would naturally
think of a "necessary" law as an embodiment of incidental powers
z23
and "proper" law as one that accorded with the lawmakers' fiduciary
responsibilities.224
Did the other convention delegates concur in this meaning of the
term "proper"? Most probably did. Their commitment to fiduciary
standards of government is evidenced throughout the Constitution. 2 5
sarily do it; the essential Trust suppos'd in all conveyance of Civil Power, is violated, and the
Grant thereby made void."); RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL
LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH
AMERICA (1776), available at http://www.constitution.org/price/price3.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2004) ("[Parliaments] possess no power beyond the limits of the trust for the execution of
which they were formed. If they contradict this trust, they betray their constituents and dissolve
themselves.").
Cf. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 106 (1690), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr09.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004):
[T]he power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed
to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's prop-
erty, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of
Nature so unsafe and uneasy.
John Dickinson expressed similar sentiments, Natelson, Dickinson, supra note 2, at 437
(2003). See also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments
(1785), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/amendl-religions43.html (last visited Aug.
Oct. 12, 2004):
Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less
can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and
vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is lim-
ited with regard to the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily is it limited with
regard to ... the constituents. The preservation of a free Government requires not
merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each department of power be in-
variably maintained; but more especially that neither of them be suffered to overleap
the great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty
of such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their au-
thority, and are Tyrants.
221 Supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.
222 BARRY, supra note 2, at 303.
223 Supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
224 The point was confirmed by the convention and ratification process. Infra passim.
The two principal competing hypotheses as to the meaning of "proper" suffer from grave
objections. Giving "proper" the broad meaning of "suitable" or "advisable" would require the
courts to reviewing the merits of challenged statutes. Giving the term a narrow, jurisdictional
meaning, cf Lawson & Granger, supra note 2, captures only part of the truth, since an agent's
actions can be manifestly improper, yet not violate jurisdictional boundaries.
225 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1136-68 (discussing how the fiduciary ideal in-
fluenced the drafting of numerous clauses, and how the ratification debates often centered on
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In addition, various comments at the convention suggest that the
framers often thought of "proper" in a fiduciary sense.
For example, an agent, then as now, had a duty to remain within
the scope of authority. In a study already alluded to, Gary Lawson
and Patricia B. Granger concluded that "proper" frequently referred to
the obligation of Congress to respect jurisdictional boundaries.226
This usage appeared often in the convention debates.227 In addition,
an agent had a duty to keep his principal informed. During the fed-
eral convention, amid the discussion of whether to retain a clause
requiring Congress to publish its proceedings, the following colloquy
took place between two delegates who were also members of the
committee of detail:
Mr. Elseworth [sic]. As the clause is objectionable in so many
shapes, it may as well be struck out altogether. The Legisla-
ture will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to
time-The <people> will call for it if it should be improperly
omitted.
Mr. Wilson thought the expunging of the clause would be
very improper. The people have a right to know what their
Agents are doing or have done . 228
Similarly, an agent representing several principals had a duty of
impartiality. As stated earlier, 229 an important meaning, or compo-
nent, of eighteenth century propriety was impartiality. At the conven-
tion, the delegates denounced as "improper" situations that interfered
with the impartiality of government officials, particularly dependence
how effective the Constitution would be in promoting that ideal).
2
26 See generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 2.
227 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 1, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 65-66:
Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and respon-
sibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as
a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of
a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing offi-
cers, not <appertaining to and> appointed by the Legislature.
Notes of James Madison (June 6, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 139. (emphasis added);
id. at 139 ( "There wd. in truth however be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the
present case."); id. at 140 ( "He thought too a junction of the Judiciary to it, involved an im-
proper mixture of powers.").
228 Notes of James Madison (Aug. 11, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 260 (emphasis
added).229Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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of one branch of government on another. 230  Roger Sherman "re-
garded the Supreme Court as improper to try the President, because
the Judges would be appointed by him.",231 James Madison ques-
tioned, "What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribu-
nals obtained under the biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the
local prejudices of an undirected jury?, 232 John Dickinson, in a sub-
sequent letter on the convention, argued that election of the President
by the legislature might have resulted in "an improper Dependence
and Connection. ' '233  Elbridge Gerry thought it "improper" for the
Vice-President to preside in the Senate because his necessary inti-
macy with the President could result in legislative dependence on the
President.234
Agents had to avoid conflicts of interest. Hence, Hamilton thought
it "highly improper" for the state legislatures to pay federal offi-
cials, 235 and Madison questioned whether any officials ought to "fix
their own wages, or their own privileges., 236 Similar conflict of inter-
est concerns induced Pierce Butler of South Carolina to argue that
new immigrants serving in the Senate would be "improper agent[s]"
for the people.237 George Mason argued that, "the Senate did not rep-
23
° The founders' value of independence is explored in Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder:
The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and Independence, 91 KY L. J. 353 (2003).
231 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 551 (emphasis
added).
212Notes of James Madison (July 26, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 124 (emphasis
added). See also Notes of James Madison (July 18, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 44
("improper dependence in the Judges"), Notes of James Madison (Aug 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 250 ("It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own
privileges. It was a power also, which might be made subservient to the views of one faction
agst. another."); Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 551
("The President under these circumstances was made improperly dependent."); Notes of James
Madison (Aug. 13, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 270 ("Who are to form the New Consti-
tution by which the condition of that class of citizens is to be made worse than the other class?
Are not the States ye agents?").
233 Hutson, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 301 (John Dickinson to George Logan, Jan. 16,
1802) (emphasis added).
See also Notes of William Pierce (May 31, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 59 ("Mr.
Mason was of opinion that it would be highly improper to draw the Senate out of the first
branch; that it would occasion vacancies which would cost much time, trouble, and expence to
have filled up, besides which it would make the Members too dependent on the first branch.").
234 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 7, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 536-37:
'The vice President shall be ex officio President of the Senate [sic]'.
Mr. Gerry opposed this regulation. We might as well put the President himself at the head
of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the President & vice-president
makes it absolutely improper."
235 Notes of Robert Yates (June 22, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 378-79 ("A state
government will ever be the rival power of the general government. It is therefore highly im-
proper that the state legislatures should be the paymasters of the members of the national gov-
ernment.").
236 Notes of James Madison (Aug. 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 250.
237 Notes of James Madison (June 13, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 236 (speech by
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resent the people, but the States in their political character. It was
improper therefore that it should tax the people. 238
On August 20, 1787, convention delegates offered various
amendments to the proposal of the committee of detail. Butler, an
advocate of enumerated powers,2 39 had prepared a motion to remove
"proper," but he never introduced it. Professor Lynch has suggested
as a reason for his restraint that Butler decided not to jeopardize what
his state already had won at the convention.24° Perhaps. But a more
natural explanation is that someone pointed out to Butler that the ef-
fect of the word "proper" was to confine rather than expand the scope
of congressional authority.
That same day, Madison offered a proposal of his own:
Mr. Madison and Mr. Pinkney moved to insert between
"laws" and "necessary" "and establish all offices" it [sic] ap-
pearing to them liable to cavil that the latter was not included
in the former.
Mr. Govr. Morris. Mr. Wilson, Mr Rutlidge and Mr. Else-
worth [all members of the committee of detail.] urged that the
amendment could not be necessary.
On the motion for inserting 'and establish all offices'
Butler):
Mr. Butler was decidely [sic] opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long
residence in the Country. They bring with them, not only attachments to other Coun-
tries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are
dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life
within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits opinions & at-
tachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs.
238Notes of James Madison (Aug. 13, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 273 (emphasis
added to "improper").
239 On May 31, Butler had questioned the broad scope of federal powers under the Virginia
Plan.
Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States
as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among
the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph the mover
of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas.
Notes of James Madison (May 31, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 53 (speech by Butler).
See also id. at 168 (Butler, opposing Congressional veto of state laws). See also Notes of James
Madison (June 8, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 168; Notes of James Madison (July 16,
1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing comments by Butler, which questioned the
grant of power to Congress "to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompe-
tent").
24°LYNCH, supra note 2, at 20.
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N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay.
Va. no. N- C- no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes -- 2; noes -- 9.]
The clause as reported was then agreed to nem con.
24 1
Thus, as the convention neared its end, most delegates thought the
Clause sufficient to accomplish its purposes and were reasonably sat-
isfied.
Only three delegates were not. On September 10, just a week be-
fore adjournment, Randolph announced that he would not sign the
Constitution. Although his Virginia Plan had contemplated a con-
solidated government and he had helped draft the Necessary and
Proper Clause, he apparently had undergone a conversion of some
kind. One of his many "objections to the System" was the "general
clause concerning necessary and proper laws. 242
Note that Randolph did not dissent from the view that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause was an expression of the doctrine of implied
incidental powers. Rather, he was determined to protect himself po-
litically and to force the friends of the Constitution to agree to an
amendment that would assure that the incidental powers doctrine was
not stretched too far. In his letter a month later to the speaker of the
Virginia House of Delegates,243 Randolph made the latter point ex-
plicit:
[Ilt is better to amend, while we have the constitution in our
power, while the passions of designing men are not yet
enlisted, and while a bare majority of the States may amend
than to wait for the uncertain assent of three fourths of the
States ....
I should now conclude this letter, which is already too long,
were it not incumbent on me, from having contended for
amendments, to set forth the particulars, which I conceive to
require correction ....
5. In drawing a line between the powers of congress and indi-
vidual States; and in defining the former, so as to leave no
241 Notes of James Madison (Aug. 20, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 345.
242 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 10, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 2, at 563.
243 Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct.
10, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra note 2, at 123-27.
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clashing of jurisdictions nor dangerous disputes; and to pre-
vent the one from being swallowed up by the other, under
cover of general words, and implication.244
The two other convention dissenters were Elbridge Gerry of Mas-
sachusetts and George Mason of Virginia, and they were more skepti-
cal than Randolph. On September 15, Gerry offered his list of objec-
tions, and then added that he
could however ... get over all these, if the rights of the Citi-
zens were not rendered insecure 1. by the general power of
the Legislature to make what laws they may please to call
necessary and proper. 2. raise armies and money without
limit. 3. to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be a
Star-chamber as to Civil cases.245
Thus, Gerry, a non-lawyer, was convinced that the Necessary and
Proper Clause not only would give broad discretion to Congress, but
unreviewable discretion. George Mason, a lawyer who seems to have
soured on the whole constitutional project, 246 agreed. He stated his
objections to the convention, 247 and then wrote an essay on the subject
that became an important part of anti-federalist literature. In his es-
say, Mason expressed dismay at the discretion vested in Congress:
Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end
of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopo-
lies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict un-
usual and severe punishments, and extend their powers ... as
far as they shall think proper; so that the State legislatures
have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to
them, or the people for their rights.248
244 Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct.
10, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra note 2, at 127 (emphasis added).245 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 632-33.246 Mason offered a host of objections and amendments to the document, generally without
a consistent theme. For example, he wanted to increase federal authority by authorizing Con-
gress to pass sumptuary laws, Notes of James Madison (Sept. 13, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra
note 2, at 606; Notes of James Madison (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 617(discussing ex post facto laws), and ex post facto laws, id. at 617, yet complained of the "dan-
gerous power and structure of the Government." Notes of James Madison (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2
Farrand, supra note 2, at 632.
247 Notes of James Madison (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 632-33. Id. at
632.
248 Mason's Objections to the Constiution of Government Formed by the Convention, in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 350.
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The dissent of these three delegates, however, must not divert us
from the fact that the other 39 still present seem to have accepted the
Necessary and Proper Clause as an appropriate statement of the inci-
dental powers doctrine and its limits.
VI. CONFIRMATION OF THE AGENCY LAW MEANING OF THE CLAUSE:
RATIFICATION
"Implication is dangerous, because it is unbounded ... If we trust





A. The Anti-Federalist Position
In the ensuing struggle over ratification, anti-federalists made the
Necessary and Proper Clause a highly contentious issue. Comments
such as the foregoing by Patrick Henry, their leading spokesman at
the Virginia ratifying convention, show that they understood the
broad meaning of "necessary" in the implied incidental powers doc-
trine-and they feared it. Further, many anti-federalists agreed with
Gerry and Mason that the necessity and propriety of federal legisla-
tion would be unreviewable.
As elaborated by their spokesmen during the weeks following the
national convention, the standard anti-federalist argument against the
Necessary and Proper Clause developed into the following:
* The Constitution will grant to Congress the power to
provide for the common defense and general welfare, if
not by the Preamble °250 then by the Taxation Clause;
251
* The Necessary and Proper Clause will grant Congress
power to pass all laws that it shall deem necessary and
proper to execute the foregoing powers;
212
249 Patrick Henry, VIRGINIA CONVENTION DEBATES, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2,
at 149-150 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention).
m Letter from Massachusetts Gentleman to his Friend, N.Y.J., Nov. 23, 1787, in 19
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 293-94 ("A Customer").
n' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States.").
252 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 640
(comments by Mason); An Old Whig II, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 17, 1787, in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 402; Brutus 1, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1787,
in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 416; Brutus V, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Dec. 13,
1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 423-27; Brutus VI, NEW YORK JOURNAL,
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* There would be no effective judicial review of such
laws ;253
* Therefore, Congress would enjoy the unlimited power to
legislate at its discretion; 254 and
Dec. 27, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 111-12.
253An Old Whig II, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 17, 1787, in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 402 ("Who shall judge for the legislature what is
necessary and proper? Who shall set themselves above the sovereign?"). The lack of judicial
review is implied in many anti-federalist treatments of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See,
e.g., A Federal Republican, A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention
Held at Philadelphia (Nov. 28, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 269-70;
Robert Whitehall, Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 399 (questioning, "Who are to be judges of what is necessary and
proper?"); John Smilie, Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 410 (making the same point).
See also John Williams, Virginia Convention Debates, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
2, at 338 (speaking at the New York ratifying convention):
I also observed, that the powers granted by it were indefinite, since the Congress are
authorized to provide for the common defence and general welfare, and to pass all
laws necessary for the attainment of those important objects. The legislature is the
highest power in a government. Whatever they judge necessary for the proper ad-
ministration of the powers lodged in them, they may execute without any check or
impediment.
"Brutus" offered a reason why there would be no effective judicial review of legislative
usurpations: "every extension of power of the general legislature.., will increase the powers of
the courts." He also discussed how the British Court of Exchequer had used various pretexts to
increase its powers. Brutus XI, N. Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 516.
254 See, e.g., Brutus V, N. Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 423:
The design of the constitution is expressed in the preamble, to be, "in order to form a
more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and posterity." These are the ends this government is to accomplish, and
for which it is invested with certain powers, among these is the power "to make all
laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-
ers and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof." It is a rulc in construing a law to
consider the objects the legislature had in view in passing it, and to give it such an
explanation as to promote their intention. The same rule will apply in explaining a
constitution. The great objects then are declared in this preamble in general and in-
definite terms to be to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare,
and an express power being vested in the legislature to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the general
government. The inference is natural that the legislature will have an authority to
make all laws which they shall judge necessary for the common safety, and to pro-
mote the general welfare. This amounts to a power to make laws at discretion: No
terms can be found more indefinite than these, and it is obvious, that the legislature
alone must judge what laws are proper and necessary for the purpose.
See also Cincinnatus Ill, N. Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 128 ("I suppose that, as well as every thing else, is included in the power 'to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper'."); Centinel V, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER,
Dec. 4, 1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 345-46; Centinel VIII,
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Congress would then be able to emasculate or abolish
the state legislatures, z5 5 abolish state taxes,256 destroy
state governments, 257 render itself perpetual or heredi-
tary,258 impose a draft,259 abolish the rights of the peo-
ple, 260 create a king, 261 and do many other nefarious
262things.
PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Jan. 2, 1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 232; Letter from William Russell to William Flemming (Jan. 25, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 468; Brutus XIII, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Feb. 21, 1787, in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 174; Letter from James Bowdoin to James de Cale-
donia, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Feb. 27, 1788, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2; Cumberland County Petition to Pennsylvania Convention, CARLISLE GAZETTE, Dec. 5,
1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 310; Robert Whitehall, Pennsylvania
Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 359 ("We
find in this Constitution an authority is given to make all laws that are necessary to carry it
effectually into operation, and what laws are necessary is a consideration left for Congress to
decide."); Letter IV from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in 19
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 233; Letter from Massachusetts Gentleman to his
Friend, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Nov. 23, 1787, in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
293-95; John Williams, New York Convention (June 26, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 330-32 (repeating a close paraphrase of the fifth essay of "Brutus" at the New York
ratifying convention); Melancton Smith, New York Convention (July 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 377 (speaking at the New York ratifying convention).
See also Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
2, at 436 ("By this they have a right to pass any law that may facilitate the execution of their
acts.").
255 Brutus L NEW YORK JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 416.256An Old Whig VI, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 24, 1787, in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 216-17; The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the
Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PENNSYLVANIA
PACKET, Dec. 18, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 22; A Farmer,
PHILADELPHIA FREEMANS JOURNAL, Apr. 16, 23, 1788, in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 142; John Williams, New York Convention (June 27, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 339.
2571Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Dec. 11, 1787), in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 407.
258A Customer. N. Y. J., Nov. 23, 1787, in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
296.
259Brutus VIII, N. Y. J., Jan. 10, 1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
336.
260 James Monroe, Virginia Convention Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at
218 (fearing abolition of trial by jury and freedom of the press); George Mason, Virginia Con-
vention Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 442 (making the same argument at
the same convention).
261 John Tyler, Virginia Convention Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 455
("Suppose, says he, that the time should come that a king should be proposed by Congress. Will
they not be able, by the sweeping clause, to call in foreign assistance, and raise troops, and do
whatever they think proper to carry this proposition into effect?").262 See George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed By the Con-
vention (Oct. 7, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 348-51. See also
Speech by Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
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To hammer home their point, anti-federalists dubbed the Necessary
and Proper Clause the "Sweeping Clause 263 and, sometimes, the
"Omnipotent Clause.
264
There were a few variations on these themes. Some anti-
federalists suggested that the drafters did not intend such unlimited
power, but that they had chosen language that invited abuse.265 Pat-
rick Henry advanced the novel contention that a plenary interpretation
of Congressional powers "was warranted ... by the addition of the
word department, at the end of the clause, and that they could make
any laws which they might think necessary to execute the powers of
any department or officer of the government. ', 266
Nonetheless, on the whole anti-federalists spokesmen merely re-
peated the themes listed above.
Of course, a lawyer considering the document objectively can see
that, other than the discretion imported by the word "necessary," the
anti-federalist position had little textual basis. A preamble grants no
power; it is an expression of purpose only.267 The "general welfare"
(Jun. 2, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 56 (fearing suspension of state laws);
Agrippa X, MASS. GAZETTE (Jan. 1, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 576(predicting that the federal government could seize control of all civil cases); Brutus V, N. Y. J.,
Dec. 13, 1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 424-25 (claiming that the Taxa-
tion Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause could result in taxes on cider and just about every-
thing else); Brutus VI, N. Y. J., Dec. 27, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
113-14 (explaining the danger of Mason's objections); Robert Whitehill, Address at the Penn-
sylvania Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 426 &
428 (suggesting that Congress could abolish the states' role in federal elections); 19
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 576 (predicting that federal government could seize
control of all civil cases).
263 Speech by Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (Jun. 9, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 150.
264 The Federal Republican VI, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 846.265 Brutus I, N. Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 416(stating, "It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the Constitution would warrant a
law of this kind!").
See also Brutus XII, N. Y. J., Feb. 14, 1787, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 120:
A voluminous writer in favor of this system [meaning "Publius," the putative author
of the Federalist Papers - ed.], has taken great pains to convince the public, that this
clause means nothing: for that the same powers expressed in this, are implied in
other parts of the constitution. Perhaps it is so, but still this will undoubtedly be an
excellent auxiliary to assist the courts to discover the spirit and reason of the consti-
tution, and when applied to any and every of the other clauses granting power, will
operate powerfully in extracting the spirit from them.
In Publius' view, arguments from usurpation were not fair. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, su-
pra note 2, at 153 (Hamilton).
266 Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
(Jun. 15, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 439.
267 Cf. 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1990-91 (Rep. William Branch Giles, making this point
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language of the taxation clause is not a grant; it is a qualification on
the immediately preceding grant.268 The incidental powers doctrine,
while it grants considerable discretion, does not bestow unreviewable
discretion-as shown by the decided cases in which judges did, in
fact, review it.
269
B. How the Federalists Responded
It took several months for friends of the Constitution to react to the
anti-federalist assault on the Necessary and Proper Clause. We find
little by way of rejoinder before November 26, 1787, when William
Cranch wrote to John Quincy Adams that if Congress had not been
given authority to make laws necessary and proper to execute the
other powers, "the powers would be of no service., 270 When the fed-
eralists finally responded, they did so by presenting their version of
what the Necessary and Proper Clause meant. This version included
non-technical expositions of the incidental powers doctrine, as limited
by agents' fiduciary duties. Federalists also enumerated certain ex-
clusive state powers to illustrate the limits of implication, and they
eventually agreed to a Bill of Rights, including the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to define further those limits in the Constitution. 271
1. Federalist Representations of Meaning
The first major clash over the Necessary and Proper Clause oc-
cuffed at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, held from November
20 through December 15, 1787. There, leading federalists secured
approval of the Constitution by pointing out that statutes authorized
by the Clause could serve only those powers expressly enumerated.
James Wilson argued:
The gentleman in opposition strongly insists that the general
clause at the end of the eighth section gives to Congress a
in the congressional debate over the first national bank); id. at 2009 (Rep. James Madison,
making the same point).
268Anti-federalists sometimes obliquely conceded this. See Brutus 1, N. Y. J., Oct. 18,
1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 414 (conceding it only as to form, not
substance); 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 270; A Federal Republican, A Rev. of
the Const. (Nov. 28, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 270 (making the
same point). I addressed fully the role of the General Welfare Clause as a limitation in Natel-
son, General Welfare, supra note 2.269 Supra Part IV(B).
270Letter from William Cranch to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26, 1787) in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 224, 226.
271 Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 476.
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power of legislating generally; but I cannot conceive by what
means he will render the words susceptible of that expansion.
Can the words, "The Congress shall have power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execu-
tion the foregoing powers," be capable of giving them general
legislative power? ... On the contrary, I trust it is meant that
they shall have the power of carrying into effect the laws
which they shall make under the powers vested in them by
this Constitution.272
On another occasion, Wilson added that the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not "in any degree, go beyond the Particular
enumeration .... It is saying no more than that the powers we have
already particularly given, shall be effectually carried into execu-
,,27317tion. This point was echoed by his ally, Thomas McKean.274
What should happen if Congress went beyond its authority? Wil-
son emphasized that legislative discretion was not unlimited; it was
subject to judicial review:
If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers
vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a conse-
quence of their independence, and the particular powers of
government being defined, will declare such law to be null
and void; for the power of the Constitution predominates.275
On January 2, 1787 an anonymous Massachusetts essayist("A.B."), responding to the influential anti-federalist essays of
"Brutus, ,276 wrote that the powers pursuant to which Congress must
272 Speech by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention on the Adoption of the Fed-
eral Constitution (Dec. 2, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 448-49 (emphasis
added).
273 Speech by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention on the Adoption of the Fed-
eral Constitution (Dec. 4, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 468. A more complete
extract is:
I leave it to every gentleman to say whether the [enumerated] powers are not as accu-
rately and minutely defined, as can be well done on the same subject, in the same
language ... nor does it, in any degree, go beyond the particular enumeration; for,
when it is said that Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper, those words are limited and defined by the following, "for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers." It is saying no more than that the powers we
have already particularly given, shall be effectually carried into execution.274 Speech by Thomas M'Kean at the Pennsylvania Convention on the Adoption of theFederal Constitution (Dec. 11, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 537 (saying that
the Necessary and Proper Clause "gives to Congress no further powers than those already enu-
merated").
275 Speech by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention on the Adoption of the Fed-
eral Constitution (Dec. 7, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 489.276 On the disputed authorship of the "Brutus" essays, see 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
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act were limited-confined to certain objects-"and these objects
particularly stated and clearly defined by the constitution. ''27 ' To un-
derscore the point, "A.B." offered an enumeration of powers that the
federal government would not have, and that would remain in the
278
states. These included "jurisdiction over murther [sic], adultery,
theft, robbery, burglary, lying, perjury, defamation," land titles, pos-
session of men's "houses, wives, children and many other
objects .... ,,279
Consequently, we see Wilson, McKean, and "A.B." all affirming
two of our conclusions from textual analysis:280 Congressional laws
must be based on one or more enumerated powers, and this require-
ment is reviewable judicially. I should add that, anti-federalist con-
cern notwithstanding, the ratifiers generally accepted that all constitu-
tional provisions would be subject to judicial review.281
supra note 2, at 411 (editor's note) (listing possible authors of the "Brutus" essays).
277A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 596-97.
278 Id. at 599.
279 Id.
280 Supra Part 1(A).
281 The prospective power of the courts to invalidate unconstitutional federal actions was
repeatedly referenced during the ratification debates. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra
note 2, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 44, at 285-86 (James Madison); Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 24, 1787, ), in I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, ch.17,
doc. 22, available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch8sl4.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2004);
THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 2, at 117 (Hamilton), No. 44, at 285-86 (Madison); James
Sullivan as "Cassius XI," in THE MASS. GAZETTE (Dec. 25, 1787), in ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE,
1787-1788, 43 & 46 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892).
See also the comments of Oliver Ellsworth, later chief justice of the United States, at the
Connecticut ratifying convention:
If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitu-
tion does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to
secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void. On
the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a
usurpation upon the general government, the law is void; and upright, independent
judges will declare it to be so.
Speech by Oliver Elsworth at Conneticut's Convention on the Adopton of the Constitution (Jan.
4, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 196.
For still further examples, see Speech by Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jun. 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at
324-25 (praising the practice of the Virginia courts in invalidating unconstitutional legislation,
and wondering whether the federal judiciary would have the fortitude to do the same); Speech
by George Nicholas at the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
(Jun. 15, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 443 ("[If Congress] exceed these
powers, the judiciary will declare it void."); Speech by Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jun. 20, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
2, at 541; Speech by Edmund Pandleton at the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (Jun. 20, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 548 (speaking on
the same topic); Speech by John Marshall at the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the
HeinOnline  -- 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 298 2004-2005
2004] AGENCY LAW ORIGINS OF NEC. AND PROP. CLAUSE 299
Pennsylvania was the second state (after Delaware) to ratify the
Constitution, and New Jersey and Georgia followed in quick succes-
sion. With the Connecticut convention about to meet, Oliver Ells-
worth wrote a series of articles under the name of "A Landholder."
On December 3, 1787, he addressed the second of the five central
questions I posed earlier: What was role of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in the Constitution? Was it a grant, a limitation, or a rule of
construction? 282 Ellsworth implied it was merely a rule of construc-
tion-a desirable protection against those who would misrepresent
the Constitution to destroy the central authority: "[Congress]," he
wrote, "must have authority to enact any laws for executing their own
powers or those powers will be evaded by the artful and unjust, and
the dishonest trader will defraud the public of its revenue. 283
On December 18, 1787, in Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton
implicitly answered our third question-What is the meaning of "nec-
essary"?284 -by adopting a deferential test for how connected a law
must be with an enumerated power:
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a
compound instead of a simple ... a confederate instead of a
sole, government, the essential point which will remain to be
adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS, as far as it can
be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or
departments of power; allowing to each the most ample au-
thority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge.
Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common
safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this
purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered
to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have rela-
tion to them. The same must be the case in respect to com-
merce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is
permitted to extend.285
Ellsworth's Connecticut ratified in January, 1788, but by that time
the writings of "Brutus" were beginning to affect the debate in other
Federal Constitution (Jun. 20, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 541, 553; Speech
by John Steele at the North Carolina Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution(Jul. 25, 1788), 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 71. For additional discussion of the
founders' expectation of judicial review, see BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 2, at 131-39.
282 Supra Part 1(B)
283 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 338 (Dec. 3, 1787).
284 Supra Part II(C).285 THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 2, at 114 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added.).
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states. On January 3, Hamilton published Federalist No. 33 in re-
sponse. Hamilton rendered explicit what Ellsworth had implied: the
Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress no power. It was a rule
of construction. Hamilton also strongly suggested an answer to an-
other of our questions: 286 The word "and" is conjunctive rather than
disjunctive; a law must be necessary AND proper-a predictable re-
sult, given Hamilton's lenient definition of "necessary:
287
[The Necessary and Proper Clause and Supremacy Clauses]
are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by
necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of
constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain
specified powers.
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing?
What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing
the means necessary to its execution? 288  What is a
LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making LAWS?
What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but
LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes,
but a legislative power, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to
lay and collect taxes? What are the proper means of execut-
ing such a power, but necessary and proper laws?
... [A] power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for the execution of that
power . . . If there is any thing exceptionable, it must be
sought for in the specific powers upon which this general
declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it
286 Supra Part I(E).
287 Supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
288 This means-end argument sometimes was expressed by the maxim: "Qui datfinem, dat
media ad finem necessaria"-who gives the end, gives the means necessary for the end. See,
e.g., the sarcastic reference in Timoleon, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 1787, in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 534, 535 ("Timoleon").
The maxim appears in SIDNEY, supra note 2, at 529. As of this writing, I have been un-
able to locate prior judicial use of it. Sidney cited Grotius for it, but Grotius said something
very different, for he was speaking of the duty of a parent to support a child:
Quia datformam, dat quae adformam sunt necessaria, dictum est Aristotelis: quare
qui causa est ut homo existat, is quantum in se est, et quantum necesse est,
prospicere ei debet de his quae ad vitam humanam, id est naturalem ac socialem,
nam ad earn natus est homo, sunt necessaria.
Hugonis Grotii, De Jure Belli et Pacis 356 (Cambridge Univ. ed. 1853) (1625).
[Vol. 55:2300
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may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least
perfectly harmless.
But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The
answer is, that it could only have been done for greater cau-
tion, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those
who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the
legitimate authorities of the Union. The Convention probably
foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to
inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political
welfare is that the State governments will finally sap the
foundations of the Union; and might therefore think it neces-
sary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to
construction. 289
Hamilton then offered a hint into our fourth central question: What
is the meaning of "proper"? 290 He wrote: 'The propriety of a law, in a
constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the
powers upon which it is founded.' ,29 1 Hamilton was referring specifi-
cally to the limited nature of federal powers, but the comment has
more general application. If congressional powers were in the "na-
ture" of agency powers-as Hamilton himself believed292-then
"propriety" had to be defined by rules applicable to agency.
On January 25, 1788, Madison added another "Federalist" essay in
which he affirmed that the Clause gave no additional authority to
Congress, and further explained the consequences that might have
ensued if it had been omitted:
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no
doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of exe-
cuting the general powers would have resulted to the gov-
ernment, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more
clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the
end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general
power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary
for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been
pursued by the convention [i.e., leaving out the
Clause] ... the real inconveniency would be incurred of not
289 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 2, at 158-59 (Alexander Hamilton).
290 Supra Part 1(D).
291 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 2, at 160 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in
original). Thus, not based primarily on questions of, say, convenience for society, but on the
kind of powers (here, agency powers) granted.292 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 2 (Alexander Hamilton).
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removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions293
for drawing into question the essential powers of the union.
As Wilson had done, Madison then affirmed that Congressional usur-
pation could be curbed by judicial review:
If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Con-
gress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and ex-
ercise powers not warranted by its true meaning ...In the
first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the
executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound
and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a
remedy must be obtained from the people who can, by the
election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the
294
usurpers.
On January 31, 1788, Alexander Contee Hanson, a member of
Congress from Maryland who wrote under the name "Aristides," pub-
lished an important pamphlet that surveyed the Constitution from a
federalist point of view. Hanson definitively agreed with Hamilton
on our fifth central question:295 "and" is conjunctive:
I take the construction of these words to be precisely the
same, as if the clause had proceeded further and said, "No act
of Congress shall be valid, unless it have relation to the fore-
going powers, and be necessary and proper for carrying them
into execution. 296
Hanson then reinforced the argument of Wilson and Madison that
federal laws would be subject to judicial review: "[E]very judge in
the union, whether of federal or state appointment, (and some persons
would say every jury) will have a right to reject any act, handed to
him as law, which he may conceive repugnant to the constitution. ' '
On the other hand, Hanson was one of the very few federalists who
did not think the Clause was surplusage: "Without this general clause,
it were easy to suppose cases, wherein a particular clause might be
incompetent to its own purpose. ' ' 29 8 However, he offered no exam-
ples. Hanson concluded by offering, as "A.B." had previously, an
293 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 2, at 234-35 (James Madison).
294 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 2, at 235 (James Madison).
295 Supra Part 1(E).
296 Alexander Contee Hanson as "Aristides," Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal
Government (Jan. 31, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 531.
297 Id. at 531.
298 Id. at 532.
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enumeration of subjects that would remain in state control and be-
yond federal interference.299
On February 6, 1788, the Massachusetts convention became the
sixth to ratify, doing so narrowly, and demanding amendments.
The first of these was, "That it be explicitly declared, that all powers
not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to
the several states, to be by them exercised. '30 1 Edmund Randolph,
who as we have seen also sought amendments, was not happy with
the Massachusetts language, characterizing it as "among the rocks on
which the old confederation has split,"3°2-presumably because its
reservation of all authority not "expressly" granted would eliminate
the doctrine of incidental agency powers. In any event, Massachu-
setts' ratification came before that state's chief justice, Caleb Cush-
ing, was able to deliver a speech asserting that the Necessary and
Proper Clause was "no more than was necessarily implied in the pow-
ers themselves. For if [Congress] could not make laws that were nec-
essary and proper to carry [t]hem into [execution], the powers them-
selves would be totally dead & Useless."303 Although an undelivered
speech could not have been persuasive, it offers further insight into
the representations that all federalists (with the partial exception of
Hanson) were advancing.
After ratification in the Bay State, federalists found progress
harder. The New Hampshire convention adjourned without having
ratified, 3°4 and Rhode Island voters rejected the Constitution in a ref-
erendum.305 On March 12, with North Carolina about to elect its
306delegates, one of that state's leading citizens, James Iredell (a fu-
299 Id. at 545 ("[Tlhe regulations of property, the regulations of the penal law, the protec-
tion of the weak, the promotion of useful arts...").
300 Tle vote at the convention was 187-168. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
xli.
Federalist delegate Dr. Charles Jarvis of Boston justified ratification with amendments by
reference to the incidental agency powers doctrine. Speech by Dr. Jarvis at the Massachusetts
Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Feb. 2, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 151 ("It is a maxim, I believe, universally admitted, that, in every instance, the
manner in which every power is to be exerted, must be in its nature discretionary with that body
to which this power is delegated.").
301 Speech by John Hancock at the Massachusetts Convention on the Adption of the Fed-
eral Constitution (Feb. 2, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 177.
302 REARDON, supra note 2, at 132.303 Undelivered speech by William Cushing (Feb. 4, 1788), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 1436.
304 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xli-ii.
305 The vote was overwhelming. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xli (noting
that the vote was 2,711 to 239).
306The election was held March 28 and 29. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
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ture Supreme Court Justice, then writing as "Marcus") addressed the
subject of the Necessary and Proper Clause:
These [enumerated] powers would be useless, except acts of
Legislation could be exercised upon them . . . If Congress,
under pretence of exercising the power delegated to them,
should, in fact, by the exercise of any other power, usurp
upon the rights of the different Legislatures, or of any private
citizens, the people will be exactly in the same situation as if
there had been an express provision against such power in
particular, and yet they had presumed to exercise it. It would
307be an act of tyranny ....
Iredell then confronted the anti-federalist argument that the new
government might seize control of the criminal law. On the contrary,
Iredell responded-other than counterfeiting, piracy, treason, and
offenses on the seas and against the law of nations-
Congress can exercise no other power of this kind, except in
the enacting of penalties to enforce their actions of Legisla-
tion in the cases where express authority is delegated to them,
and if they could not enforce such acts by the enacting of
penalties, those powers would be altogether useless .... 308
Iredell's argument thereby reinforced two points the federalists al-
ready had made repeatedly: (1) Congress would have no capacity to
legislate for any purpose other than the enumerated ones, and (2) the
Necessary and Proper Clause really adds nothing, because Congress'
enumerated powers already carry incidental powers with them. Oth-
erwise, the enumerated powers would be nugatory. One of the two
delegates named MacLaine (Archibald or William is not clear) ech-
oed the same sentiments at the North Carolina ratifying convention:
This clause specifies that they shall make laws to carry into
execution all the powers vested by this Constitution; conse-
quently, they can make no laws to execute any other power.
This clause gives no new power, but declares that those al-
ready given are to be executed by proper laws.
309
307 Marcus IV, NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH J., Mar. 12, 1788, in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 379-80.
308 Id. at 381.
309 Maclaine, Remarks at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 141.
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Iredell then made explicit the connection between the Constitution's
enumeration of authority and powers of attorney: "It is a declaration
of particular powers by the people to their representatives, for particu-
lar purposes. It may be considered as a great power of attorney, under
which no power can be exercised but what is expressly [sic] given. 3 1°
Despite the efforts of Iredell and MacLaine, however, the North Caro-
lina convention adjourned without having ratified.31'
With opposition strong in North Carolina, New Hampshire and
Rhode Island, with ratification in Maryland in April 312 and in South
Carolina (with amendments) in May,31 3 it appeared that the fate of the
Constitution would be decided in New York and Virginia. The con-
test in both states was extremely close.314 It was in Virginia that the
climatic battle was fought.31 5
On February 28, 1788, the Petersburg, Virginia Gazette published
an essay by "An Impartial Citizen," in which the author attacked
George Mason's broad construction of the Necessary and Proper
Clause with an explicit statement of the incidental powers doctrine:
Now, I insist that Mr. Mason's construction on this clause is
absolutely puerile, and by no means warranted by the words,
which are chosen with peculiar propriety. When a power is
vested any where, from the nature of things it must be under-
stood to be attended by such other incidental powers as are
necessary to give it efficacy; for to say, that a power is given,
without the power of enforcing it, is a solecism in lan-
guage.316
3 10James Iredell, Remarks at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, (July 28, 1788), in
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 148. See also id. at 166 (repeating same argument). See
also Conciliator, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Jan. 15, 1788, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at microfilm supp. 1485-95 (analogizing the Constitution's grant of powers to
grant of powers to a ship captain and discussing the inherent limits in such a grant and the
uselessness of itemizing specific limitations).
31 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xlii (reported by the editor).312 Id. at xli (ratification by 63-11 margin as reported by the editor).
313 Id. at xlii (ratification by 149-73 as reported by the editor).
314 Both states ultimately ratified, New York by a margin of 30-27 and Virginia by 89-79.
Both states proposed amendments. Id. (reported by the editor).
3 5 In New York, the convention defeated a motion by John Lansing, "That no power shall
be exercised by Congress, but such as is expressly given by this Constitution; and all others, not
expressly given, shall be reserved to the respective states, to be by them exercised." John Lans-
ing, Motion at the New York Ratifying Convention (July 2, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 406.316An Impartial Citizen V, PETERSBURG VA. GAZETrE, Feb. 28 1788, in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 431.
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Hamilton had offered an important clue to the meaning of our
fourth central question: the meaning of "proper." Now the "Impartial
Citizen" completed the explanation:
In this case, the laws which Congress can make... must not
only be necessary, but proper-So that if those powers can-
not be executed without the aid of a law, granting commercial
monopolies, inflicting unusual punishments, creating new
crimes, or commanding any unconstitutional act; yet, as such
a law would be manifestly not proper, it would not be war-
ranted by this clause, without absolutely departing from the
usual acceptation of words.
3 17
The "Impartial Citizen' s" list of improper laws all were governmental
analogues of common breaches of fiduciary duty. A government
granting a commercial monopoly bestowed a favor on one group to
the exclusion of others. This was a breach of the duty of impartial-
ity.318  Inflicting unusual punishments-like violating rights
generally-breached both the duty of impartiality and the duty of
loyalty, for an agent must not oppress his principals.319 Laws creating
new crimes or commanding unconstitutional acts violated the agent's
obligation to remain within the scope of authority.32°
On April 2, "A Native of Virginia" wrote to affirm that the Clause
gave no powers beyond those enumerated, and to explain, as Ells-
worth, Hamilton and Madison had previously, that the Necessary and
Proper Clause "is necessary; as without it the different states might
317 Id.
318 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1157-58.
-19 Cf James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82, 82-84 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (1785),
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documentslamendI-religions
4 3.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2004):
As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, so it violates the
same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions.
Either we must say, that they may controul the freedom of the press, may abolish the
Trial by Jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary Powers of the State; nay
that they may despoil us of our very right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an
independent and hereditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no authority to
enact into law the Bill under consideration.
We the Subscribers say, that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no
such authority: And that no effort may be omitted on our part against so dangerous
an usurpation, we oppose to it, this remonstrance; earnestly praying ... that the Su-
preme Lawgiver of the Universe ... turn their Councils from every act which
would.., violate the trust committed to them ....
320 See infra Part VUII(D) (explaining why this interpretation of "proper" is not a substan-
tive limitation, so the Clause is still a rule of construction).
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counteract all laws of Congress, and render the Federal Government
nugatory.,, 321 A week later, still another federalist writer, "Cassius,"
emphasized that the Clause merely gave Congress capacity to effectu-
ate its express powers.322
The Virginia ratifying convention met on June 2.323 It soon
erupted into oratorical fireworks. Patrick Henry's assaults on the
Constitution were heavily punctuated with barrages against the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. Again and again, Henry-who shared the
federalists' view that government officials should be the people's
agents324-slammed home the anti-federalist line: that, working in
tandem with the Preamble and General Welfare Clause, the Necessary
and Proper Clause would give Congress unfettered power to erect an
absolute tyranny in America!
Henry was an orator equal to any four men. Fortunately for the
Constitution, he faced-without eloquent assistance on his own
side-not four, but five highly talented opponents. They were Ed-
mund Pendleton, George Nicholas, James Madison, John Marshall 325
-and Governor Edmund Randolph.326 For Randolph was arrayed
once again with the friends of the Constitution. To be sure, he con-
321 A Native of Virginia, Observations upon the propsed plan of Federal Government with
an attempt to answer some of the principal objections that have been made to it (Virginia Ga-
zette 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 675.
322 Cassius H, To Richard Henry Lee, Esq., VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 714 (stating in an article published on April 9, 1788,
that "Congress can make no laws, except such, as are, essentially, necessary to carry into execu-
tion the particular powers, given to them by the constitution").
323 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xlii (reported by the editor).
324 Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (May 14, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 324 ("Rulers are the servants and agents of the people: the
people are their masters.").
325 Marshall did not address the Necessary and Proper Clause directly, but gave a lengthy
speech in which he stressed the role of government officials as the people's agents. John Mar-
shall, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 225 ("You cannot exercise the powers of government personally yourselves.
You must trust to agents."); id. at 227 ("We are answered, that the powers may be abused;
that ... Congress may ... prostitute their powers to destroy our liberties. This goes to the
destruction of all confidence in agents."); id. at 233 ("Are they not both the servants of the
people? Are not Congress and the state legislatures the agents of the people, and are they not to
consult the good of the people?").
For a contemporary reaction to Henry's brilliant battle against very talented federalists, see
Letter from William Nelson, Jr. to William Short, (July 12, 1788) in 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1701-02.326 Pendleton was of the former generation, REARDON, supra note 2, at 31, but the others
were all tightly knit. George Nicholas was the brother of Randolph's wife. REARDON, supra
note 2, at 125. Madison and Randolph had a long-time political alliance. Id. at 43 and passim,
and Madison was the godfather to Randolph's third child. Id. at 75. When Randolph left law
practice to become governor, he handed over his clients to Marshall. Id. at 88.
Nicholas and his brother, Wilson Cary Nicholas (also a delegate at the Virginia conven-
tion), had worked closely with Madison before, notably in obtaining passage of the Virginia
Statute for Religious Freedom. Banning, supra note 2, at 118, 122.
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tinued to express doubts and state his desire for amendments.
327
Nonetheless, he engagingly argued that, when all was said and done,
the Constitution had to be ratified. On June 10, he opened his defense
of the Necessary and Proper Clause with the standard federalist posi-
tion:
This formidable clause does not in the least increase the pow-
ers of Congress. It is only inserted for greater caution, and to
prevent the possibility of encroaching upon the powers of
Congress. No sophistry will be permitted to be used to ex-
plain away any of those powers; nor can they possibly as-
sume any other power, but what is contained in the Constitu-
tion, without absolute usurpation.328
Randolph's argument fit well with a comment on a related topic the
previous day by pro-Constitution delegate Henry Lee of Westmore-
land County: "if a man delegated certain powers to an agent, it would
be an insult upon common sense to suppose that the agent could le-
gally transact any business for his principal which was not contained
in the commission whereby the powers were delegated ....
Later on June 10 th, George Nicholas-lawyer, former state legisla-
tor, former colonel in the continental army,330 and Randolph's brother
in law33 1-rose to speak:
The gentleman [Henry] has adverted to what he calls the
sweeping clause, &c., and represents it as replete with great
dangers .... The committee will perceive that the Constitu-
tion had enumerated all the powers which the general gov-
327 Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 25 ("As with me the only question has ever been between
previous and subsequent amendments .... ).
328 Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 206.
To be sure, Randolph had alluded earlier to the issue of delegated powers. Edmund
Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 16, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 70-7 1:
Experience and history, the least fallible judges, teach us that, in forming a govern-
ment, the powers to be given must be commensurate to the object. A less degree will
defeat the intention, and a greater will subject the people to the depravity of rulers,
who, though they are but the agents of the people, pervert their powers to their
emoluments and ambitious views.
329 Henry Lee, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 9, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 186. Lee was arguing that a bill of rights was unnecessary because
the powers delegated to the federal government did not extend to suppressing citizen rights.
330 Brief biographical facts may be found at
http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/nexsen-nicholoff.html#RJ60 0 A5II (last visited Aug. 29,
2004).
331 REARDON, supra note 2, at 125.
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ernment should have, but did not say how they were to be ex-
ercised. It therefore, in this clause, tells how they shall be ex-
ercised. Does this give any new power? I say not. Suppose
it had been inserted, at the end of every power, that they
should have power to make laws to carry that power into exe-
cution; would this have increased their powers? If, therefore,
it could not have increased their powers, if placed at the end
of each power, it cannot increase them at the end of all. This
clause only enables them to carry into execution the powers
332given to them, but gives them no additional power.
Then it was Madison's turn. In response to a renewed offensive
from Henry, Madison, who had earlier in the convention made clear
333his own adherence to the agency theory of government, now re-
sorted to the doctrine of incidental agency powers:
[W]hat new terrors can arise from this particular clause? It is
only a superfluity. If that latitude of construction which he
[Henry] contends for were to take place with respect to the
sweeping clause, there would be room for those horrors. But
it gives no supplementary power. It only enables them to
execute the delegated powers. If the delegation of their pow-
ers be safe, no possible inconvenience can arise from this
clause. It is at most but explanatory. For when any power is
given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make
laws to execute it.
3 34
Reinforcing Madison was the Old Dominion's most respected lawyer,
Chancellor Edmund Pendleton, another devotee of the agency theory
of government: 
335
I understand that clause as not going a single step beyond the
delegated powers. What can it act upon? Some power given
332 George Nicholas, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 245-46 (emphasis in original).
333 James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 306 ("The members of the one government, as well as of
the other, are the agents of, and subordinate to, the people.").
3-1 James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 438 (emphasis added).
335 Edmund Pendleton, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 298 ("[Tjhe people are consequently the fountain of all
power. They must, however, delegate it to agents, because, from their number, dispersed situa-
tion, and many other circumstances, they cannot exercise it in person."); Edmund Pendleton,
Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in id. at 550 ("The honorable
gentleman to-day said it was putting too much confidence in our agents and rulers.").
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by this Constitution. If they should be about to pass a law in
consequence of this clause, they must pursue some of the
delegated powers, but can by no means depart from them, or
arrogate any new powers; for the plain language of the clause
is, to give them power to pass laws in order to give effect to
336the delegated powers.
In the words of the reporter, "Mr. GEORGE NICHOLAS, in reply
to the gentlemen opposed to the clause under debate, went over the
same grounds, and developed the same principles, which Mr. Pendle-
ton and Mr. Madison had done. 337  Nicholas then examined the
remedies for Congressional usurpation: "[W]ho is to determine the
extent of such powers? I say, the same power which, in all
well-regulated communities, determines the extent of legislative pow-
ers. If they exceed these powers, the judiciary will declare it void, or
else the people will have a right to declare it void. 3 38 Meanwhile,
when anti-federalists argued that the new federal government might
use the treaty power to make land cessions that damaged the southern
states, Randolph responded with the standard Whig doctrine that such
a breach of the trust duty of impartiality would be ultra vires.
339
"There is a prohibition naturally resulting from the nature of things, it
being contradictory and repugnant to reason, and the law of nature
and nations, to yield the most valuable right of a community, for the
exclusive benefit of one particular part of it."
340
The federalist case having been made, Governor Randolph could
not resist exercising another of his characteristic turns. Although he
previously had said that the "sweeping clause" added nothing to Con-
gressional authority,34' he now reverted to some of the doubts he had
expressed in Philadelphia on September 10 of the previous year.
"Gov. RANDOLPH observed that he had some objections to the
clause. He was persuaded that the construction put upon it by the
336 Edmund Pendleton, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 441.
337 Id. at 442.
338 George Nicholas, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 443.
-39 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
340 Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 13, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 362. See also id. at 504-05 (Randolph); James Madison,
Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 13, 1788), in id. 504-05; James Madison,
Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 18, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 501 (Madison, pointing out that not even the King of England could dismember the
empire by treaty).
341 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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gentlemen, on both sides, was erroneous; but he thought any con-
struction better than going into anarchy." 342
On the following day, he explained his thinking at greater length:
Permit me to return to that clause which is called by gentle-
men the sweeping clause. I observed, yesterday, that I con-
ceived the construction which had been put on this clause by
the advocates of the Constitution was too narrow, and that the
construction put upon it by the other party was extravagant.
The immediate explanation appears to me most rational. The
former contend that it gives no supplementary power, but only
enables them to make laws to execute the delegated
powers-or, in other words, that it only involves the powers
incidental to those expressly delegated. By incidental powers
they mean those which are necessary for the principal thing.
That the incident is inseparable from the principal, is a maxim
in the construction of laws. A constitution differs from a law;
for a law only embraces one thing, but a constitution embraces
a number of things, and is to have a more liberal
construction .... On this principle, what should be said of the
clause under consideration? ... If incidental powers be those
only which are necessary for the principal thing, the clause
would be superfluous.
Let me say that, in my opinion, the adversaries of the Consti-
tution wander equally from the true meaning.343
After digressing to other subjects, Randolph returned to the Clause
later in his speech:
My objection is, that the clause is ambiguous, and that that
ambiguity may injure the states. My fear is, that it will, by
gradual accessions, gather to a dangerous length.34
In other words, he still supported giving Congress implied powers,
but feared the Necessary and Proper Clause could be construed to
grant more. Randolph continued:
.42 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 444 (as recorded by the reporter).
.
34 Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 463-64.
344 Id. at 470.
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But, sir, are we to reject it [the Constitution], because it is
ambiguous in some particular instances? I cast my eyes to
the actual situation of America. I see the dreadful tempest, to
which the present calm is a prelude, if disunion takes place. I
see the anarchy which must happen if no energetic govern-
ment be established. In this situation, I would take the Con-
stitution, were it more objectionable than it is ....
Whether we shall propose previous or subsequent amend-
ments [i.e., previous or subsequent to ratification], is now the
only dispute . . . .I ask gentlemen whether, as eight states
have adopted it, it be not safer to adopt it, and rely on the
probability of obtaining amendments, than, by a rejection, to
hazard a breach of the Union?
345
In other words, Randolph wanted to ensure that the Necessary and
Proper Clause did not increase Congressional jurisdiction-that it
represented only its intended purpose-and thus he favored ratifica-
tion only with amendments.
And that is what he got. The convention in Virginia approved the
Constitution by a 53-47 percent margin 346 and only because the con-
vention voted to demand extensive changes. The convention's very
first amendment read as follows: "That each state in the Union shall
respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not
by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States, or
to the departments of the federal government. ' '347 This, of course,
was very similar to the first amendment adopted by the Massachusetts
convention, 348 with this important difference: the adverb "expressly"
before the word "delegated" had been deleted. Under the Virginia
formulation, the federal government would enjoy implied incidental
agency powers-but no more.
2. Federalist Enumerations and Agreement to Amendments
During the ratification process, the line between laws "proper" or
"improper" was sharpened by specific federalist representations as to
what powers would be reserved exclusively to the states. In the first
345 Id. at 470-71.
346 On June 25, 1788, Virginia became the tenth state to ratify. The margin was 89-79. 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xlii (reported by editor).
41Amendments to the Constitution, Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 659.
.48 See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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six months of 1788, many promoters of the Constitution-especially
prominent lawyers-issued enumerations of this kind. Among these
authors of short lists were Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, Pendleton,
Iredell, and, interestingly enough, John Marshall. In addition, several
anonymous Federalist authors offered short enumerations.349 More
elaborate and complete lists came from the pens of other federalist
writers, anonymous 350 and otherwise. We have seen that one pseu-
donymous federalist ("A.B.") began the process, and that Alexander
Contee Hanson ("Aristides") 351 continued it. Still others were Na-
thaniel Peaslee Sargeant, a Justice (and shortly thereafter, Chief Jus-
tice) of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; 352 Alexander
White, a distinguished Virginia lawyer;353 and businessman Tench
Coxe.3 54 All of these enumerations were remarkably consistent, with
much overlap but relatively little dispute among federalist writers
about which powers were reserved to the states.
I previously have written about these enumerations of state pow-
ers. 355 In capsule form, the federalist representations were that, out-
side the capital district, national authority would not include training
the militia or appointing militia officers, nor control over local gov-
ernment, real property, personal property outside of commerce, do-
mestic or family affairs, crimes malum in se (except treason, piracy,
and counterfeiting), state court systems, the law of torts or contracts
(except in suits between citizens of different states), religion, educa-
tion, services for the poor and unfortunate, agriculture, or other busi-
ness enterprises. 6 This list reassured the wavering public that inci-
349 For detailed citations and who said what, see Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at
476-88.
-
50A.B., HAMPHSIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788, reprinted in, 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 2, at 599; Anonymous, MASS. GAZETT'E, Jan. 8, 1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 651-52. Both clearly were intended to be relied on. The former was in specific
response to the claims of the anti-federalist essayist "Brutus" that the Constitution imposed
insufficient limits on the federal government. The latter was reprinted in two other papers. In
the MASSACHUSErS CENTINEL, the piece was published under the headline, "READ THIS!
READ THIS!" Anonymous, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 652.
351Aristides, Remarks on the proposed plan of a Federal Government (1788), in I
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 462 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph eds. 1987); Letter from Contee
Hanson to Tench Coxe (Mar. 27, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 520-21
(referring to the "avidity, with which I am informed my humble essay has been bought up.").
352 Letter from Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger (1788), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 568.
353 The relevant (first) portion of White's essay (with explanatory annotations) is found at
Alexander White, Essay, VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 401-08.354 Tench Coxe, A Freeman III, PA. GAZETrE, Feb. 6, 1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 49.355 Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2.356 Id. at 481-88. In addition, see Roger Sherman to Unknown Recipient, Dec. 8, 1787, in
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dental powers would not be construed too broadly, and that the Con-
stitution sanctioned only laws that were truly "proper" to congres-
sional agents' sphere of authority.357
As we have seen, the federalists were not able to win their narrow
ratification victories in Massachusetts or Virginia until they agreed to
clarifying amendments. In all, seven states-a majority-proposed
similar amendments when ratifying.358 The outgrowth of these pro-
posals was the Bill of Rights, especially the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments,359 which preserved the incidental agency doctrine, but
assured that would not be applied with too much latitude. When the
First Congress met in 1789 and James Madison introduced his pro-
posed amendments, he particularly emphasized the need to limit the
scope of implication under the Necessary and Proper Clause.36°
VII. CONFIRMATION OF THE AGENCY LAW MEANING OF THE
CLAUSE: THE BANK DEBATES
The first great debate over the Necessary and Proper Clause after
ratification of the Constitution occurred in 1791. The subject was the
constitutionality of the federal government granting a corporate char-
Hutson, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 288 (stating that state courts will have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over "all causes between citizens of the same State, except where they claim lands under
grants of different states").
357 See the strictest use of "proper," supra note 85 and accompanying text.
358 Amendments were proposed by Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Vir-
ginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at xli - xlii.
An extant letter from Madison to Hamilton offers a glimpse into the bartering process.
Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (Jun. 22, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1665 (discussing the plan of the federalists to concede recommenda-
tory amendments so as to secure ratification in Virginia).
359 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); id. amend. X ("The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
360 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 455-56 (stating that Congress may, in absence of a bill of
rights, abuse the Necessary and Proper Clause by adopting measures neither necessary nor
proper).
James Monroe (the future President) had made a similar argument before ratification in a
pamphlet entitled "Some Observations on the Constitution." Monroe had written:
All powers not ceded [to the federal government] it is true belong to the people; but
those given in a constitution are expressed in general terms ... this involves in it the
right of making laws for the purpose, for the means are included in the power; oth-
erwise it is a nullity.
James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution (May 25, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 859.
Noting, therefore, that Congress might conclude that abolishing the right of trial by jury,
freedom of conscience, and freedom of the press was within its implied powers, Monroe con-
cluded that it was important to enumerate those rights. Id.
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ter to a Bank of the United States. The bill was uncontroversial in the
Senate; the spheres of debate were the House of Representatives and
President Washington's cabinet.
Controverted post-ratification statements usually are poor evidence
of pre-ratification understanding.36' In this debate, however, there
was-with the partial exception of Hamilton, who was an outlier on
the political spectrum362-a striking amount of underlying agreement
on the role, although not the application, of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Both proponents 363 of the Bank and opponents364 treated the
Clause as an expression of the incidental agency powers doctrine, and
agreed that it gave Congress no additional powers. The opinion of
Edmund Randolph, now attorney general, treated the matter this way:
[W]e come to the last inquiry, which has been already antici-
pated, whether [the bank bill] be sanctified by the power to
make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into execution the powers vested by the Constitution. To
be necessary is to be incidental, or, in other words, may be
denominated the natural means of executing a power.
The phrase, "and proper," if it has any meaning, does not
enlarge the powers of Congress, but rather restricts them. For
no power is to be assumed under the general clause [i.e., the
Necessary and Proper Clause], but such as is not only neces-
sary but proper, or perhaps expedient also.
But as the friends to the bill ought not to claim any advantage
from this clause [i.e., the Necessary and Proper Clause], so
ought not the enemies to it, to quote the clause as having a re-
strictive effect. Both ought to consider it as among the sur-
361 Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36
2 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. See Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alex-
ander Hamilton on the Constiutionality of a National Bank, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at
96, 98 (outlining Hamilton's theory of "resulting powers" supposedly held by
govemment,-those neither express nor implied-and his view that government powers [as
opposed, presumably to individual rights and freedoms], ought to be construed liberally).
363 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1959 (statement by Rep. Fisher Ames). See also id. at 1955
(statement by Rep. Fisher Ames) (analogizing government to a corporation and its incidents, the
later apparently drawn from Blackstone). See supra note 193 and accompanying text; Alexan-
der Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National Bank, in BANK HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 99 (showing that even Hamilton agreed with this point).
364 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1947 (statement by Rep. James Madison). See also id. at
1982 (statement by Rep. Michael Jennifer Stone) (stating that the consensus followed the view
that never did any country more completely unite in any sentiment than America in this, "that
Congress ought not to exercise, by implication, powers not granted by the Constitution").
HeinOnline  -- 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 315 2004-2005
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2
plusage which as often proceeds from inattention as cau-
tion.365
Thus, "necessary" meant "incidental." The word "and" was con-junctive, because "proper" was restrictive.3 66  Randolph also seemed
to be saying that for a law to be "proper" it had to be expedient for theprincipal-that is, it had to be a reasonable exercise of the agent'sdiscretion. But the clause as a whole added nothing of substance.
That rendered it a rule of construction.
The constitutional argument over the bank really circled not
around the purpose of the Clause but its application. Both sides
agreed that the bank bill had to be tied to one or more express pow-
ers,367 but they disagreed as to the identity of such powers. Some
opponents argued that an implied power had to be absolutely neces-
sary to an express one. At least one proponent, Rep. Fisher Ames
369of Massachusetts, claimed a national bank met that test. Other pro-ponents, however, demonstrated that an incidental power could also370 371be reasonably necessary or customary. 37  They then pointed out
how a bank could be reasonably necessary 
-and that it was cus-tomary, since many other governments used national banks. 373  The
365 Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Ednund Randolph, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at89, in Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: TheAttorney General's First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 127 (1994).3661 do not understand Randolph to be implying that "proper" has no meaning; the sense isthe same as in, "If you are a man at all, you'll do it."3672 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1992, 1994 (statement by Rep. William Branch Giles);Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National Bank, in BANK HISTORY,supra note 2, at 99, 103 ("[T]he doctrine [that Congress may charter a corporation] is statedwith this express qualification, that the right to erect corporations does only extend to cases andobjects within the sphere of the specified powers of the Government.") (emphasis in original).368 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1984 (statement by Rep. Michael Jennifer Stone); id. at1993 (statement by William Branch Giles) ("I have been taught to conceive that the true exposi-tion of a necessary mean to produce a given end was that mean without which the end could notbe produced."); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, in BANK
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 92-93.
369 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1956-57 (statement by Rep. Fisher Ames).370 Id. at 1998-99 (statement by Rep. Elbridge Gerry).37 Id. at 1961 (statement by Rep. Theodore Sedgwick) ("It is universally agreed that wher-ever a power is delegated for express purposes, all the known and usual means for the attain-ment of the objects expressed are conceded also."). See also id. at 1962 ("known and usualmeans"); id. at 1974 (statement by Rep. Elias Boudinot) (referring to "the common and usual
necessary means").372 Id. at 1958 (statement by Rep. Fisher Ames) (stating that the business of a national bankcould be done "badly" without incorporation, but that incorporation was indispensable for doingit "well, safely, and extensively"); id. at 1975 (statement by Rep. Elias Boudinot) ("[h]e had notheard any argument by which it was proved [in absence of a bank] that either individuals, pri-vate banks, or foreigners could with safety and propriety be depended on as the efficient andnecessary means for so important a purpose."); id. at at 1998-2001 (statement by Rep. Elbridge
Gerry).
.
73 Id. at 1956, 1959 (statement by Rep. Fisher Ames); 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 2007
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opponents then argued that the bank was neither necessary374 nor, in
the case of this particular bank, customary.375 The sides also argued
over the magnitude of the incorporation power, with opponents claim-
ing that it was so momentous that it was really a principal rather than
an incident.376 Opponents pointed out that broad implication would
contradict the federalists' pre-ratification representations on the scope
of national authority.377 Bank supporters asked opponents to be more
precise as to where they would draw the limits of implication. 378 Fi-
nally, the opponents claimed (although not exactly in this language)
that the bill would violate Congress' fiduciary duties by creating mo-
nopolies and otherwise benefiting some Americans at the expense of
others. 379 The friends of the Bank did not posit any power of Con-
gress to erect monopolies or adopt "partial" legislation. They argued
only that the bill erected no monopoly, and would benefit all.380
Thus, the tenets of agency law framed the debate. Given the way
this controversy has been painted-as a defining moment in Ameri-
can constitutionalism-it is significant how parties differing so much
on application, could agree on principle.
VIII. INTERPRETATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Clause Should be Interpreted as an Expression ofAgency
Law
We have seen that the Necessary and Proper Clause was an ex-
pression of the doctrine of implied incidental agency powers, exercise
(statement by Rep. John Vining); Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the
National Bank, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at 111-12.
-74 Id. at 2009 (statement by Rep. James Madison).
375 Id. at 1969 (statement by Rep. James Jackson, distinguishing this proposal from foreign
banks); id. at 1985 (statement by Rep. Michael Jennifer Stone).
3761d. at 1950 (statement by Rep. James Madison); id. at 1991 (statement by Rep. William
Branch Giles).
377 Id. at 1951 (statement by Rep. James Madison); id. at 1995 (statement by Rep. William
Branch Giles).
.78 Id. at 1955 (statement by Rep. Fisher Ames).
379 Id. at 1941, 1968 (statement by Rep. James Jackson); id. at 1950 (statement by Rep.
James Madison); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, in BANK
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 91.
See also 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1973 (statement by Rep. Elias Boudinot) (observing
the acknowledgment of Congress' "trust" responsibilities by leading proponents); id. at 2003
(statement by Rep. Elbridge Gerry); id. at 2012 (statement by Rep. James Madison).
3
-101d. at 1941 (statement by Rep. John Laurance [or "Lawrence"]) (claiming that benefits
of the bank would be diffused); id. at 1941 (statement by Rep. Elbridge Gerry) (denying that
the bank would be a monopoly); Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the
National Bank, in BANK HISTORY, supra note 2, at 99.
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of which was to be subject to fiduciary duties and to be policed by the
courts. Although substantively surplus, the provision, synergistically
with the Supremacy Clause (and ultimately with the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments), was a rule of construction clarifying the scope of fed-
eral jurisdiction. To pass muster under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, any federal law had to (a) be a good faith effort to pursue at
least one of the enumerated powers, rather than a pretext to exercise
an ungranted power; (b) be necessary-that is, be indispensable, rea-
sonably necessary, or customary; and (c) be "proper"-that is, com-
pliant with Congress' fiduciary obligations. Hence, Professor Randy
E. Barnett had it right when he concluded, "The appropriate legal
construct [for interpreting the Clause] is not the surrender of rights to
a master, but the delegation of powers to an agent."
381
B. "Necessity" As an Incident
An instinctive approach to analyzing the Necessary and Proper
Clause is to look for general meanings of "necessary" as a condition
precedent to exercise of a power. This approach takes the form in
symbolic logic:
-ND-P
That is, "if a measure is not necessary to execute an express power,
then the measure is not within the power." However, the Necessary
and Proper Clause is better thought of as the former expression's con-
trapositive,382 with the law's "necessity" as a necessary consequence.
As set forth in logical form:
PDN
That is, if the law is incidental to the express power, it is "necessary."
Coke and Blackstone had taught American lawyers that when a prin-
cipal was granted, "[t]he incident shall pass by the grant of the princi-
pal. 383 The term "necessary" served as a rule of construction to re
mind the reader that when the people granted Congress express pow-
381 Barnett, supra note 2, at 217.
382 See Stephen F. Barker, THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC (1965) (explaining that to form a con-
trapositive, the subject and predicate reverse positions and each is negated. The result is an
expression logically identical to the original. Thus, the contrapositive of, "If it is a house, it is a
building" is "If it is not a building, it is not a house." The same can be done with categorical
sentences-e.g., "All houses are buildings" becomes "All non-buildings are non-houses.").
383 COKE, supra note 2, at folios 151a n.3, 152a, 349b; 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at
176 (stating the rule is a restatement of the maxim, "accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur, suum
principale"-the accessory does not lead, but follows, its principal").
[Vol. 55:2
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ers, then implied powers, as understood in agency law, rode with
them as a rent rides on a reversion. 384 Certainly eighteenth century
agency jurisprudence was extensive enough to provide a set of gen-
eral principles and many illustrative precedents.385 It also was defer-
ential enough so that, when applied to legislative enactments, it al-
lowed Congress a wide area of discretion.
During the ratification process, John Marshall, a young lawyer
with a growing private practice,386 had been a resolute supporter of
the "agency theory" of government. 387  So we can understand now
why he was right when he ruled that the term "necessary" in this con-
text could mean "convenient" or "useful. 388
C. The Clause Embodies Limitations
Agency law also dictates that an agent's discretion can be limited
by the structure and wording of his authority.389 The Clause's man-
date that laws must be adopted to execute enumerated powers and not
for other purposes, coupled with the fiduciary duty of good faith, sug-
gests that courts should strike down legislation enacted for purposes
outside the enumerated powers. That was the position of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in McCulloch.390 To be sure, democratic governance
requires that Congress usually receive the benefit of the doubt. But
when Senators boast to their constituents about how they "voted for a
bill to get more federal cash to our farmers, 391 or "sponsored a bill to
keep guns out of schools" 392 -then it's a pretty safe bet that the bill in
question wasn't really about commerce, or about any other enumer-
ated power.
In 1791, Madison pointed to another structural aspect of the Con-
stitution that limits the scope of implication: Article I, Section 8
384 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 176; COKE, supra note 2, at folio 152a.3
95 Supra Part IV(B).
386 He had succeeded to Governor Randolph's clients. REARDON, supra note 2, at 88.
3
8
7 John Marshall, Remarks at the Commonwealth of Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 225 ("You cannot exercise the powers of government
personally yourselves. You must trust to agents."); id. at 227 ("We are answered, that the pow-
ers may be abused; that ... Congress may ... prostitute their powers to destroy our liberties.
This goes to the destruction of all confidence in agents."); id. at 233 ("Are they not both the
servants of the people? Are not Congress and the state legislatures the agents of the people, and
are they not to consult the good of the people?").
388 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 413 (1819).389 See supra Part V(D). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 2, at 160 (Hamil-
ton).
39°McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 358-59.
391 Cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128 (1942) (sustaining federal agricultural
program).
392 Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free Schools
Zone Act).
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enumerates powers that would be surplus if one interpreted the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause too expansively. In arguing against the bill
for chartering a national bank, Madison observed:
The latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned by
the rule furnished by the constitution itself.
Congress shall have the power "to regulate the value of money";
yet it is expressly added not left to be implied, that counterfeitors
may be punished.
They have the power "to declare war," to which armies are more
incident, than incorporated Banks, to borrowing; yet is expressly
added, the power "to raise and support armies"; and to this again,
the express power "to make rules and regulations for the govern-
ment of armies"; a like remark is applicable to the powers as to a
navy.
The regulation and calling out of the militia are more appurtenant
to war, than the proposed bank, to borrowing; yet the former is not
left to construction. The very power to borrow money is a less
remote implication from the power of war, than an incorporated
monopoly bank, from the power of borrowing-yet the power to
borrow is not left to implication.393
Madison left his case half-argued, for he did not add that, while
Congress was empowered, 'To regulate commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes, 3 94
the drafters still found it necessary to add the discrete powers, "To
establish ...uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies"; 395 ,
To ... fix the Standard of Weights and Measures"; 396 "To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries"; 397 and "To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations." 398 Nor did Madison list in detail the representations that,
during the ratification debates, his own side had made about the pow-
ers outside the federal sphere.399
393 2 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 1949 (statement by Rep. James Madison).
394 U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 3
395 Id. at cl. 4.
396 Id. at cl. 5.397 Id. at cl. 8.
39 Sd. at cl. 10.
399 See supra Part VI(B)(2) and accompanying text.
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D. The Implications of "and Proper."
Under our reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, one must
reconcile the conclusion that it was substantive surplus with the con-
clusion that "and proper" embodies a fiduciary-style restriction on
Congress. After all, if "and proper" substantively restricted Congress,
then the provision was not wholly surplus.
One must, however, recall that the founders were steeped in the
contemporary Whig teaching that, under natural law government, as
an agent and trustee of the people, had no legitimate authority to be-
tray its principals. Richard Price had written: "[Parliaments] possess
no power beyond the limits of the trust for the execution of which
they were formed. If they contradict this trust, they betray their con-
stituents and dissolve themselves. ' 4°  When this is understood, the
founders' contention that the Clause added nothing of substance to
the Constitution remains viable: Without the Clause, the Congress
would still have "necessary" powers but could not legitimately violate
fiduciary norms by adopting improper laws. Modem courts choosing
to enforce the Necessary and Proper Clause to restrict government
must decide whether to enforce the phrase "and proper" as an affirma-
tive limitation in itself, or as the founders saw it: a mere reflection of
underlying natural law.
Elsewhere, I have argued that much of the modem congressional
special-interest horse-trading probably violates the purpose of the
General Welfare Clause.4°1 We have seen that it also may transgress
the Necessary and Proper Clause. In view of the goals of the Consti-
tution's drafters and promoters, this is not a surprising conclusion. As
historian Lance Banning has remarked of the Father of the Constitu-
tion, "Madison did not define the public good as nothing more than
the result of bargaining among competing interests." 402  Certainly
judicial enforcement of fiduciary norms would require more stringent
review of spending and economic regulations now routinely approved
under the "rational basis test. 40
3
400 Richard Price, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Govern-
ment, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America Part I, § 2 (1776), available at
http://www.constitution.org/price/price.txt. For other examples of this view, see supra note 220.
401 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See also Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2.
402 Banning, supra note 2, at 129.
403 The rational basis test sustains laws if they have some conceivable connection to a le-
gitimate government purpose, even if there is no evidence that the legislature ever considered
that purpose. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
414-15 (1997).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Despite its presence among seventeen granted powers, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause did not give additional authority to Congress.
The overwhelming weight of evidence from the ratification era shows
that its purpose was to serve as a rule of construction. It was designed
to make explicit two aspects of the Constitution-incidental powers
and fiduciary limitations-that the drafters and ratifiers thought al-
ready inherent in the rest of the document.
The role of the Necessary and Proper Clause was to indicate to fu-
ture public officials and citizens that:
* Unlike Congress under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress under the Constitution would enjoy fairly
broad incidental powers just as other agents enjoyed
incidental powers under prevailing rules of common
law and equity.
" These incidental powers were limited to those that
were, bona fide, adopted to further the exercise of the
express powers.
* The Clause required congressional laws to accord
with fiduciary standards roughly similar to those
governing agents in the private sector. In other
words, Congress was to remain within its (somewhat
restricted) realm of authority, and proceed in good
faith, with reasonable care, and with impartiality and
loyalty toward its constituents.
" Congressional compliance with the rules of the
Clause was to be monitored by the President, the
people, and the courts.
Thus, enforcing the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause would require a higher standard of judicial review than courts
currently apply to federal spending and economic legislation.
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